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ABSTRACT
In 1893 historian Frederick Jackson Turner first presented his frontier thesis to a group of
historians at the World’s Columbian Exposition, a fair honoring the four-hundredth anniversary
of Christopher Columbus’ expedition, in Chicago, Illinois. Since then, scholars have long
debated the role that the frontier played in shaping the development of the United States. The
Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s history, and,
when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the development of the
United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been recognized. Kentuckians
found themselves at the forefront of a multifaceted struggle between the United States and
Europe’s most powerful empires for control of the trans-Appalachian West. The manner in
which Kentuckians interpreted and responded to the realities of daily life in the region shaped the
foreign and domestic agendas of the developing United States and influenced the actions of
foreign political representatives. This analysis of the Kentucky statehood movement, framed by
the conventions themselves, reveals how Kentucky’s political leaders were shaped by, and often
times influenced, national and international politics while carefully attending to their own local
political agendas.
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INTRODUCTION
Such was the situation of this country twenty-two years ago. In this situation the people became
politicians from necessity, not from choice. In this situation they commenced those public
consultations, discussions and political transactions, which terminated in the ultimate
independence of their country. These will be the subject of the following chapters.
–William Littell, Political Transactions, 18061
William Littell, a legal historian born in New Jersey and raised in Pennsylvania,
immigrated to Kentucky in 1801. He quickly immersed himself in politics and, following a brief
stint practicing medicine in Mt. Sterling, was commissioned to write an account of the Kentucky
statehood movement in 1806. Littell was hired by Federal Judge Harry Innes and a number of the
state’s most well-known political leaders to refute claims alleging their involvement in the
Spanish Conspiracy of twenty years earlier.2 Humphrey Marshall, a cousin of US chief justice
John Marshall, was the primary architect of the accusations and frequently lambasted Innes in
the Frankfort Western World. Innes soon brought libel suits against Marshall and the
newspaper’s co-founder, Joseph Street. Political Transactions was released later that year. Littell
carefully attempted to absolve Innes and his cohort of sympathizing with Spain by drafting a
narrative of the statehood movement’s most defining moments. Marshall offered his response
with the release of History of Kentucky in 1812. The work was decidedly partisan in nature and
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William Littell, Political Transactions in and concerning Kentucky, from the First
Settlement Thereof, Until It Became an Independent State, in June, 1792 (Frankfort, KY:
William Hunter, 1806).
2
Colonel James Wilkinson at least purported to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish
empire in what became known as the Spanish Conspiracy. Wilkinson traveled to New Orleans
and met with Louisiana governor Esteban Rodríguez Miró in August 1787. Wilkinson promoted
Kentucky as a buffer zone for Spain’s valuable Mexican silver mines and promised to sway
Kentuckians to the Spanish crown. Wilkinson, in return, requested a position within the Spanish
government, a royal pension, and a western trade monopoly. See Andro Linklater, An Artist in
Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson (New York: Walker,
2009), 71–92; Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 121–33.
1

sought to vilify anyone that he believed played a role in the Spanish Conspiracy. Innes’ suit
against Marshall ended in 1814 with a hung jury and was not settled until the following year
when the two signed an agreement ending the case. Marshall later broke the agreement and
ultimately got the last word when he published a revised and more vituperative adaptation of his
work in 1824—eight years after Innes’ death.3
The defining events of the Kentucky statehood movement, that encapsulated the lives of
Marshall and Innes during the 1780s, and afterward became the subject of bitter quarrels
between the two men, illustrate that Kentucky politics reached far beyond the frontier.4 The
Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s history, and,
when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the development of the
United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been recognized. Kentuckians
found themselves at the forefront of a multifaceted struggle between the United States and
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John E. Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1992), s.v. “Littell, William;” Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, “Marshall, Humphrey,” in
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, 609–10; Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Federal
Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky, 1789–1816 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), 46–47, 52–53; John Mason Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky: A Narrative of
Public Events Bearing on the History of that State up to the Time of Its Admission into the
American Union (Louisville: John P. Morton, 1889), 213–17; Lowell H. Harrison and James C.
Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 158;
William McClung Paxton, The Marshall Family, or a Genealogical Chart of the Descendants of
John Marshall and Elizabeth Markham, His Wife, Sketches of Individuals and Notices of
Families Connected with Them (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1885), 80–82; “Harry Innes versus
Humphrey Marshall: depositions, 1809–1815,” Reuben T. Durrett Collection on Kentucky and
the Ohio River Valley, Durrett Cdx 206, Special Collections Research Center, University of
Chicago Library, Chicago, IL (hereinafter Durrett Collection, UC); Littell, Political
Transactions; Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, 2nd ed. (Frankfort, KY: S. Robinson,
1824), vol. 1.
4
Kentucky, Montgomery, and Washington counties were established on December 31,
1776, when the Virginia legislature officially dissolved Fincastle County. Kentucky County
largely encompassed the same area that the state of Kentucky would in 1792. The Kentucky
district was formed in March 1783 and consisted of Fayette, Jefferson, and Lincoln counties. See
Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 31–32, 52–53.
2

Europe’s most powerful empires for control of the trans-Appalachian West. The manner in
which Kentuckians interpreted and responded to the realities of daily life in the region shaped the
foreign and domestic agendas of the developing United States and influenced the actions of
foreign political representatives. The debates at the Kentucky statehood conventions were
likewise shaped by the national and international issues of the day, as Kentuckians wrestled with
tough questions: should Kentucky separate from Virginia? Who would benefit from separation?
How and when should independence occur? What should the new state government look like?
Who should fill leadership positions? How would separation affect the local economy? These
questions defined the Kentucky separatist movement and were quickly complicated by the many
possibilities and differing viewpoints offered by Kentuckians.5
The fate of the United States remained largely unsettled throughout the 1780s. Although
American officials hoped to bring stability to the trans-Appalachian West through diplomacy,
they were often at odds with one another and the region’s leaders about how best to accomplish
that goal. Kentucky lay at the center of a complex competition between the British, Spanish, and
regional Indian groups to halt US expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains. These groups
hoped to stunt the growth of the United States and protect their regional interests by quashing its
efforts to achieve sustained commercial and territorial development. The national government
failed to implement basic measures that ensured the physical and economic well-being of its
outlying populace, and many, as a practical alternative, began to call for the creation of an

Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic
History,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 647–77; Kevin T. Barksdale, “Introduction:
Kentucky and the Struggle for the Early American West,” Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society 114 (2016): 291–302; Christopher L. Leadingham, “To Open ‘the Doors of Commerce’:
The Mississippi River Question and the Shifting Politics of the Kentucky Statehood Movement,”
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 114 (2016): 342.
5
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independent western state. These individuals believed that their needs could best be addressed
through localized government. Kentuckians assembled in convention ten times between 1784
and 1792 to discuss the possibility of separating from Virginia.6
Kentuckians spoke out against the misappropriation of surveying fees, called for the
establishment of a western printer, supported protection for orphans and the poor, and identified,
in addition to a number of other issues, problems with the court system. They disapproved of the
lack of navigable roads, bridges, and waterways in the region despite the sizeable share of taxes
that Kentuckians paid to the Virginia state government. Most importantly, however, Kentuckians
sought protection from antagonistic Native groups and spoke out against their inability to mount
offensive strikes against them. Some Kentuckians began to question the legitimacy of the
American Revolution in the West and adapted the images, symbols, and rhetoric of the war to
advocate separating from Virginia. The early statehood conventions centered on issues of land
redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as delegates
disparaged what they considered to be a distant and unresponsive state legislature.7 It was not
until Spain closed the Mississippi River to US traffic in 1784 that the movement gained traction

6

Reginald Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776–1815 (Arlington
Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1985); George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S.
Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Patrick Griffin,
American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang,
2007); Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
7
See John R. Van Atta, Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the
Old Republic, 1785–1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), for an
examination of US western land policies and their effect on the political, economic, and social
development of the United States.
4

and began to be viewed as a North/South conflict, as legislators from Virginia sided with
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river.8
The Mississippi River played a vital role in the developing Kentucky commercial
economy. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their goods to market and expected the
national government to quickly negotiate the reopening of the waterway. The proposed
Jay/Gardoqui agreement merely heightened tensions in the region when word spread that the
settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five
to thirty years. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive
government, and some, such as Thomas Green of Louisville, threatened to take matters into their
own hands. Even the ongoing debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were
shaped by the arguments made by people in the West. Kentuckians questioned the rationale for
the new government and believed the new system would make it easier for the Atlantic states to
cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain. James Madison assured westerners that navigation
rights to the river would become a national issue under the new government. He expected
Kentucky delegates to play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to
gain their support. Kentuckians did not actively participate in the debates, despite Madison’s
prediction, and the convention approved the new government in June 1788. Kentucky officially

8

Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779–1792 (New York:
Atheneum, 1972); Lowell H. Harrison, Kentucky’s Road to Statehood (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1992); Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 55–58; George
Morgan Chinn, Kentucky Settlement and Statehood, 1750–1800 (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical
Society, 1975); Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Three Virginia Frontiers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1940); Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky (Lexington, KY: John
Bradford Press, 1960). See also Joan Wells Coward, Kentucky in the New Republic: The Process
of Constitution Making (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979); Tachau, Federal
Courts; Lowell H. Harrison, John Breckinridge: Jeffersonian Republican (Louisville: Filson
Club, 1969); Fredrika J. Teute, “Land, Liberty and Labor in the Post-Revolutionary Era:
Kentucky as the Promised Land” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988).
5

became a state on June 1, 1792. Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi
River with the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty on October 27, 1795, and, by the late 1790s, a
plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state.9
Kentucky and its peoples clearly occupied an important space in the early American and
Atlantic worlds. Kentucky’s political leaders were shaped by, and often times influenced,
national and international politics while carefully attending to their own local political agendas.
Historians of the frontier and early Kentucky have, however, been slow to recognize the
important role that the state’s political leaders played in shaping the development of the United
States and larger Atlantic world. Early accounts of Kentucky emphasized the state’s rich natural
resources and promoted the region as an “agrarian promised land” waiting to be settled by selfsufficient yeoman farmers.10 This characterization was widely accepted and perpetuated in the
American public consciousness and shaped historical interpretation of both Kentucky and the
frontier for decades to come. The United States soon expanded beyond the Mississippi River,
and, by the late nineteenth century, writers began to reinterpret Kentucky’s regional identity as
eastern instead of western. Kentucky, for those writers, was significant inasmuch as the state

9

Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 16, 21–22, 64–65; Herring, From
Colony to Superpower, 32, 47–48, 70; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 40–45, 54–57; Stephen
Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry
Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 89–92.
10
Craig Thompson Friend, “Introduction,” in Craig Thompson Friend, ed., The Buzzel
about Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 2.
See, for example, John Filson, The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke
(Wilmington: James Adams, 1784), available online from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, at
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=etas (accessed
February 25, 2017). See Friend, ed., The Buzzel about Kentuck, 1–22, for an insightful overview
of Kentucky historiography.
6

ensured the perpetuation of America’s fundamental political and social institutions as the country
expanded westward.11
Historian Frederick Jackson Turner completely reshaped the study of American history in
1893 when he presented his frontier thesis to a group of historians at the World’s Columbian
Exposition, a fair honoring the four-hundredth anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ expedition,
in Chicago, Illinois. Turner linked the development of American national character to the
expansion of the frontier. He argued that the realities of life on the frontier reshaped traditional
European beliefs and practices into a unique American identity that was continually refined as
the frontier moved farther west. Turner, however, ignored the complex intercultural relationships
that developed on and beyond the frontier, and, as a result, masked the true political instability of
the trans-Appalachian West. Britain, Spain, and various Native American groups remained key
players in the region well into the nineteenth century.12
Historians have since rejected much of the Turnerian thesis and are now working to better
situate the trans-Appalachian West in a critical, global context. Francois Furstenberg places the
backcountry at the center of Atlantic world history between 1754 and 1815 in his article “The
Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.” Furstenberg contends that,
when viewed from multiple perspectives, the Seven Years’ War did not end in 1763, but, rather,
continued with only minor breaks until 1815. This extended conflict, which the author has

Friend, ed., The Buzzel about Kentuck, 4–5. This premise was based on the “germ
theory” articulated by Herbert Baxter Adams. Adams, who hoped to introduce scientific study to
the discipline of history, believed that America’s most basic institutions were rooted in AngloSaxon tradition. See, for example, Nathaniel S. Shaler, Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1885), available online at https://archive.org/details/
kentuckypioneerc00shal (accessed February 26, 2017).
12
Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in
The Frontier in American History, ed. Frederick Jackson Turner (New York: Henry Holt, 1921),
1–38.
11

7

labeled the “Long War for the West,” was fought at various points across the trans-Appalachian
West. Furstenberg demonstrates that settler discontent and foreign intrigue in the region was a
significant threat to US sovereignty as the nation struggled to assert its political and economic
independence. Similarly, in The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815, Reginald Horsman
identifies political independence, domestic security, commercial expansion, and territorial
acquisition as the main driving forces behind US policy during this period and emphasizes the
important position that the trans-Appalachian West held in relation to those goals.13
Many authors have been able to demonstrate the importance of the trans-Appalachian
West to the development of early American politics by examining the processes of identity
formation and state making. Patrick Griffin argues in American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and
Revolutionary Frontier that western settlers created their own notions of sovereignty and social
order as a result of racism and an increasingly violent atmosphere. Griffin views the western
frontier from a Hobbesian standpoint (civil society cannot exist without a government) and
asserts that the frontier derived much of its powerful influence from the violent conflicts that
erupted between Native Americans and westerners. The manner in which westerners responded
to that atmosphere and the compromises that resulted with eastern leaders, the author explains,
played important roles in shaping the developing national government. Andrew R.L. Cayton
explores the development of regional identities in the trans-Appalachian West and concludes that
regional tensions and competition for limited governmental resources sparked many of the
western statehood movements. Historian Kevin T. Barksdale moves in a similar direction with

Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,”
647–77; Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic.
13

8

his analysis of the failed state of Franklin in The Lost State of Franklin: America’s First
Secession.14
This study builds upon existing scholarship that demonstrates the importance of the transAppalachian West and, by extension, Kentucky, to the development of the United States and
larger Atlantic world. The intersection of the Kentucky statehood movement and the politics of
the early republic underscore a number of political, economic, and social issues that defined the
domestic and foreign policies of the United States as the untested national government struggled
to assert its political and economic independence in the years following the Revolutionary War.
Kentucky’s political leaders played important roles in shaping the nation’s policies towards
Native Americans, commerce and transportation, and territorial expansion. Kentuckians also
played a critical role in reshaping the national government in debates concerning the ratification
of the Constitution. The debates at the statehood conventions were likewise shaped by national
and international issues, particularly Spain’s closure of the Mississippi River, further
demonstrating the importance of viewing Kentucky, and the statehood movement, in a wider,
transatlantic context.
Chapter one begins by outlining the basic territorial claims that shaped British and French
imperial policy in the trans-Appalachian West and highlights the contested nature of the region
itself. Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural
resources of the trans-Appalachian West, and the violent confrontations that ensued played an
important role in unifying both groups. This section builds upon Patrick Griffin’s analysis of

Griffin, American Leviathan; Andrew R.L. Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the
Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the TransAppalachian West,” Journal of American History 79 (1992): 39–67; Kevin T. Barksdale, The
Lost State of Franklin: America’s First Secession (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
2009).
14

9

frontier violence and self-sovereignty in American Leviathan to illustrate how notions of fear and
Indian hating provided the impetus for the early Kentucky statehood conventions. Many
Kentuckians believed that only an independent state could best secure the financial and military
resources needed to ensure their protection and framed the movement in terms of an East/West
divide. Kentuckians, by speaking out against the Virginia and US governments, shaped state and
national policies concerning Native Americans and played an important role in identifying and
critiquing the failings of the national government under the Articles of Confederation.
Chapter two opens on June 26, 1784, when Spanish officials closed the Mississippi River
to US traffic. This section describes the importance of the river to the developing Kentucky
commercial economy and builds upon the themes outlined by Reginald Horsman in The
Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815 to illustrate how the closing of the Mississippi River
and the proposed Jay/Gardoqui agreement positioned Kentuckians at the center of the
competition between the United States and Spain to control the trans-Appalachian West. Spain
intended to use the backcountry desire to access the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in
negotiations with the United States. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and
unresponsive government, and some hoped to leverage their allegiance to the United States in an
attempt to improve their situation on the frontier. This section also suggests an important change
in the framing of the statehood movement (from an East/West to North/South divide) after
legislators from Virginia sided with Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the
Mississippi River.
Chapter three builds upon the previous chapter to illustrate how the national debates
concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were shaped by the arguments made by people
in the West. Many Kentuckians questioned the motivation behind the new system, believing that

10

the Atlantic states could more easily forfeit control of the Mississippi River to Spain under the
new government. James Madison expected Kentucky delegates to cast the deciding votes at the
Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to gain their support. Kentucky delegates did not
actively participate in the convention debates, and, in the end, did not play the decisive role that
Madison anticipated. Kentuckians, overall, however, played a significant role in shaping the
development of the new government by joining fellow westerners in demanding a government
that was attentive and responsive to their needs. This section also identifies how the ongoing
national debates reciprocally shaped the Kentucky statehood movement.
Chapter four outlines the final statehood conventions and identifies a number of
important factors that determined what the new Kentucky government would look like as the
state took shape. Kentuckians were particularly divided over which courts should hold
jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. The right to hold slaves emerged as the most contentious
issue discussed at the final statehood convention. Proponents of the institution argued that the
Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the private property rights of slave owners.
Convention delegates, in the end, voted to allow slaveholding in the new state, despite the efforts
of an antislavery faction led by Presbyterian minister David Rice. Kentucky officially became a
state on June 1, 1792, and a plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state by the
late 1790s. The integration of political and economic systems bolstered the gentry’s foothold in
the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky frontier. Slaveholders across the
United States gained an important victory with the ratification of the 1792 constitution—
precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West.
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CHAPTER ONE
“Such is our melancholy situation…To whom else shall we apply?”
For while they see no vigorous & decided steps taken by Government to prevent the cruelties &
Depredations of the Savages, they are apt to conclude as the reason, that those in Administration
feeling nothing of their sufferings, are consequently indifferent to their Situation: they therefore
wish for a separation, because they then expect that every one in power will be equally interested
with themselves in securing a friendly Intercourse with their troublesome Neighbors.
–Walker Daniel to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 178415
Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural
resources of the trans-Appalachian West. British officials struggled to maintain peace in the
region following the close of the Seven Years’ War, and violent confrontations between
Amerindians and Euro-American settlers became commonplace as the settlement and
development of the trans-Appalachian West continued apace. Violent acts committed both by
and against Native peoples unified western settlers in a way that no other did. Kentuckians began
to look towards eastern governments and political leaders for assistance as the frequency of raids
against frontier settlements intensified after the outbreak of the American Revolution. Many
Kentuckians believed that an independent state would best be able to secure the financial and
military resources needed to ensure their protection. The early statehood conventions centered on
issues of land redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as
delegates spoke out against the Virginia and US governments. Kentuckians, in so doing, shaped

15

Walker Daniel to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1784, in The Calendar of Virginia State
Papers and Other Manuscripts, 9 vols., ed. Raleigh Edward Colston, Henry W. Flournoy,
Sherwin McRae, and William Pitt Palmer (1875–1893; repr., New York: Kraus, 1968), 3:586–87
(hereinafter The Calendar of Virginia State Papers).
12

state and national policies concerning Native inhabitants and played an important role in
identifying and assessing the shortcomings of the Confederation government.16
Into the West
The wealth and natural resources of the trans-Appalachian West had long been contested
by the British, French, Spanish, Cherokee, Delaware, Shawnee, and various other Amerindian
groups who peopled the region. England laid claim to a substantial portion of the backcountry
and, by extension, much of North America via the Virginia colony. In 1609, King James I of
England extended the boundaries of Virginia westward to the Pacific Ocean and two hundred
miles north and south of Old Point Comfort.17 England’s claim to the region was bolstered in
1671 with the discovery of the New River, a tributary of the Kanawha River with headwaters in
western North Carolina, by explorers Thomas Batts and Robert Fallam. The pair was dispatched
from Fort Henry by fur trader Abraham Wood and followed the river to Peters’ Falls before
claiming the Ohio River Valley on behalf of Great Britain.18
Woods sponsored another expedition in 1673 in hopes of establishing trade agreements
with outlying Native American groups. The voyage was led by frontiersman James Needham,
and it was during this trip that the first detailed accounts of Kentucky and its Native inhabitants

16

See Van Atta, Securing the West; Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The
Seven Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2003); Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation
of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Gregory Evans Dowd, War under
Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002); Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed
Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Griffin, American Leviathan; Horsman, The
Diplomacy of the New Republic; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion; Barksdale, “Introduction:
Kentucky and the Struggle for the Early American West,” 301.
17
Old Point Comfort is located along the southeastern tip of the Virginia Peninsula.
18
Peters’ Falls is located near the modern Virginia–West Virginia border. Harrison and
Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 15–16, 20; Otis K. Rice, Frontier Kentucky (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1975), 1–2.
13

were collected. France asserted control of much of the Ohio and Mississippi river valleys based
upon the explorations of French explorers Jacques Marquette, Louis Joliet, and René-Robert
Cavalier, Sieur de la Salle.19 The region was especially important to France because the valleys
connected French Canada and Louisiana. The close of the Seven Year’s War (1754-1763) and
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763 changed the political makeup of the North American
continent. Spain gained control of New Orleans and all French-held territory west of the
Mississippi River while Britain acquired Canada and Spanish Florida. The subsequent
restructuring of imperial governments affected the daily lives of thousands of Amerindians and
Euro-Americans across the continent.20
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An uneasy peace settled over the upper Ohio Valley as British officials focused on
establishing peace with the Ohio Indians. However, territorial disputes, trade and diplomacy
issues, and the fate of British captives quickly discouraged harmony between the two groups.
Native societies were soon divided between those who sought peace and those who opposed the
continued British advance into the region. Spiritual regeneration messages preached by Delaware
prophet Neolin and echoed by Ottawa Chief Pontiac bolstered Native alliances and encouraged
attacks against frontier settlements. The backcountry once again plunged into a state of chaos in
early 1763 as Amerindian raids (precipitated by Pontiac’s siege of Fort Detroit) swept across the
frontier. Larger British outposts such as Forts Niagara, Pitt (formerly Duquesne), and Detroit—
all recently acquired from the French—successfully endured long and bitter sieges. However,
smaller strongholds scattered across the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry were quickly
overtaken and destroyed by adept Amerindian warriors, leaving frontier settlers and their
homesteads exceptionally vulnerable.21
Fear of Native peoples characterized the lives of backcountry settlers long after the
uprising was brought to a close. Amerindian raiding parties numbering upwards of sixty to onehundred men (divided into smaller groups) often simultaneously attacked multiple homesteads.
The production of fear was their main objective. Attacks typically occurred during the daylight
as settlers anxiously tended their crops (when the season permitted) and were the most exposed
and vulnerable. Succinct, concurrent attacks against an entire area allowed Native raiders to
quickly and efficiently capture as many people and livestock as possible—this was followed by
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the burning of houses, crops, and barns. Amerindian raiders often capitalized upon the settlers’
fear by staging gruesome vignettes with the bodies of their most recent victims, mutilated and
carefully positioned in highly visible locations, before reuniting with the larger party and
withdrawing farther west. Settlers most feared violent home invasions that occurred during the
night or at daybreak. These, however, were less common than daytime raids.22
Such tactics terrorized backcountry settlers and bolstered for many a deep-rooted hatred
of Native Americans. These sentiments cut across class lines as wealthy and poor westerners
found common ground amidst a common enemy. Settlers began to look towards eastern
governments and political leaders for support but were met with an unresponsive British
government that was unable (or unwilling) to restore order in the West. Virginia, by the late
1770s, extended west to the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio River into what became the
Northwest Territory. Great Britain began to finance and coordinate raids against frontier
settlements following the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. The new American government
also failed to establish order in the trans-Appalachian West, and westerners became even more
disenchanted by their inability to garner adequate resources and support. Some settlers simply
became indifferent to the American Revolution, while others began to develop their own notions
of self-sovereignty.23

22

Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 41–45.
Harrison, Kentucky’s Road to Statehood, 24–25; Harrison and Klotter, A New History
of Kentucky, 20; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 184. The Northwest Territory was
established in 1781 after Virginia and other states that possessed western lands ceded a great deal
of territory to the nascent United States government so that it might be self–sustaining. The
territory extended west from Pennsylvania and north of the Ohio River and encompassed
portions of present–day Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio. For additional
information see Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the Nation-State: The Washington
Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West,” 39–67.
23

16

Many westerners, as a practical alternative to unresponsive state and national
governments, championed the formation of a frontier commonwealth. These individuals believed
that an independent western state could quickly and efficiently address the social, economic, and
political issues faced by its peoples through localized government. Proponents of localist ideals
believed that power should be concentrated in state legislatures and denounced strong,
centralized government. These individuals proved unwilling to uphold a compact with a national
government that offered neither security nor economic prosperity to western citizens. A frontier
commonwealth, most importantly, would allow westerners to develop and enact policies aimed
at curbing Indian attacks. American officials carefully monitored the situation in the West,
fearful that backcountry settlers could easily be enticed to secede from the union and join with
either Great Britain or Spain—both often entertained the possibility of western secession.24
The First Convention
Violence characterized the daily lives of Kentuckians long after the official close of the
American Revolution. Although no longer supplied and orchestrated as part of large-scale British
operations, Indian attacks continued to menace the frontier well into the 1790s as the settlement
and development of Kentucky continued apace. Kentucky attorney general Walker Daniel
cautioned in May 1784 that the failure of the national government “to prevent the cruelties &
Depredations of the Savages” encouraged discontent among the settlers and was the leading
cause of separatist movements across the frontier.25 In November 1784, Lincoln County militia
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colonel Benjamin Logan received intelligence that a group of Cherokee and Chickamauga
raiders were threatening to advance upon the region.26 Logan called for westerners to assemble
in Danville, the meeting place of the newly established Kentucky District Court, to discuss how
best to approach the situation. Aware there was no time to contact officials in Richmond, Logan
hoped to quickly assemble militia units and launch preemptive strikes against the raiding party.
George Muter, Samuel McDowell, and Caleb Wallace, members of the eastern aristocracy and
newcomers to the frontier, cautioned that any offensive action would be considered extralegal in
light of current Virginia law. Someone recommended that the group petition the Virginia
legislature for more flexibility in handling the Amerindian threat. Ebenezer Brooks, at that time a
leading proponent of Kentucky statehood hoping to advance the interests of his cohort, asserted
that the group should consider separating from Virginia. The motion was not seconded and the
topic subsequently not opened for discussion. By the second day of the meeting, word spread
that the Cherokee and Chickamauga raiders had merely been posturing and no longer posed a
serious threat. Logan, nevertheless, called for an official meeting to consider the security and
resource concerns of the region and to discuss the prospects of an independent Kentucky. The
meeting was slated for December 27, 1784, and one representative from each militia company
was supposed to be designated to attend the gathering. Harry Innes later recalled that “every one
[sic] present saw the absolute necessity of calling together the wisdom of the District in a general
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Council to take into consideration the then state of our detached and distressed Country.”27
Kentuckians took their first major step toward statehood by calling for the official meeting and,
at least for the moment, as Innes described, presented themselves as a unified assembly prepared
to confront the Virginia government. 28
The movement for statehood was shaped and propelled by diverse groups of settlers.
Although they shared certain common interests, especially a desire for frontier defense, the
statehood proponents were divided over several issues. There were no political parties in frontier
Kentucky, but, for her 1972 book on early Kentucky politics, historian Patricia Watlington
categorized the groups debating statehood into three distinct political parties: the partisans, court
party, and country party. Watlington contends that these parties are related to, but distinct from,
the Federalist and Republican parties that developed on a national level during the 1790s.
Landless settlers formed the core constituency of the partisans, who looked to the national
government for assistance when faced with an unresponsive state legislature. These men,
commonly referred to as “rabble” by their opponents, called for a redistribution of western land
and envisioned the Bluegrass as a region of opportunity far removed from Virginia’s social and
political circles.29
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The partisan-led separatist movement began in 1779 but lacked official leadership until
1782, when land company agents began both to encourage and participate in the push for
statehood. Non-Virginia land speculators argued that the region actually belonged to the US
Congress and encouraged discontent among the backcountry populace as a way to secure title to
large tracts of western land. John Campbell, a native Irishman and former Philadelphia trader,
supported the congressional claim despite acquiring rights (via the Virginia claim) to four
thousand acres near the falls of the Ohio River (present-day Louisville). Campbell believed that
he and others could obtain thousands more acres if the Virginia claim was negated. In the spring
of 1782, land company agents began circulating copies of Thomas Paine’s Public Good, which
argued against Virginia’s claim to the region. “That the most extraordinary part of the whole is,
that Virginia should countenance such a claim,” Paine explained.30 “For it is worthy of
observing, that, from the beginning of the contest with Britain, and long after, there was not a
people in America who discovered, through all the variety and multiplicity of public business, a
greater fund of true wisdom, fortitude, and disinterestedness, than the colony of Virginia.”31
Land agents also began to spread rumors in 1783 that Congress had declared the Virginia claim
invalid, circulating a series of phony letters—purportedly written by congressional leaders—as
proof. 32
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Partisan leaders found petitioning to be their most effective recourse. Five petitions were
forwarded to Virginia and four were sent to Congress between 1780 and 1784. Petitioners spoke
against unjust land laws and the ineffectual district court and requested that Kentucky soon
become a separate state. A June 1782 petition sent to the Virginia statehouse called for a
redistribution of land and requested the formation of a better government or independence from
Virginia. “Such is our melancholy situation—We fly to your house for redress, To whom else
shall we apply? We know by experience that Kentucky has friends in your house, and we now
call on them with an Importunity that becomes distressed Citizens to espouse the use of justice
for us.”33 Watlington has suggested that the partisans were likely more cognizant of their
political affiliation than the court or country parties, but maintains that their membership was
never very stable—although it accounted for nearly fifty percent of Kentucky’s total population
at the party’s height. Key members of the partisans included Ebenezer Brooks, a medical doctor
and Presbyterian minister originally from Delaware, and land speculators Arthur Campbell and
George Pomeroy.34
Members of the court and country parties formed what Watlington describes as the
“articulate center”—native Virginians and members of the gentry who saw themselves as the
natural leaders of Kentucky.35 Court and country party members shared similar backgrounds and
upheld comparable principles, but were largely divided along family lines and by personal
quarrels. Unlike the partisans, both groups favored a constitutional separation from Virginia in
order to prevent a redistribution of western land, and thus sought to position themselves in
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leadership roles. Watlington contends that lawyers and judges, who came west as land cases
proliferated and the western court system expanded in the 1780s, accounted for the majority of
court party members. These men were well versed in the art of oral and written communication
and were keenly aware of the political milieu in which they found themselves. Most of these
gentlemen arrived in the backcountry too late to secure large tracts of land. They hoped to
emerge as the political leaders of the region and imagined Kentucky as a manufacturing hub for
much of the South and Southwest. Court party members saw the Mississippi River as the
lynchpin of the burgeoning Bluegrass economy and expected to use the river to export their
domestic manufactures. Thus, securing sustained and unrestricted access to both the Mississippi
River and the Spanish port of New Orleans proved to be a primary concern for the party.
Prominent members included John Brown, Harry Innes, John Fowler, Samuel McDowell,
Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and Colonel James Wilkinson—each newly settled in the
region.36
The country party was headed by Thomas Marshall, father of future US chief justice
John Marshall. These men were mostly slaveholders who owned large plantations and hoped to
recreate a planter culture in the West that mirrored that of the Virginia Tidewater. Country party
members, unlike their court party counterparts, believed that a strong, centralized government
would promote a stable economy. They were deeply loyal to the union and largely uninterested
in Mississippi River trade, instead focusing on overland trade routes to the East. Robert
Breckinridge, Robert Bullitt, John Edwards, Joseph Crockett, and the outspoken Humphrey
Marshall formed the core leadership of the country party. Members of the country and court
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parties, despite their differences, united to maintain the status quo in terms of class relations and
spoke passionately against the partisan call for land redistribution, which reached its peak by the
winter of 1783-1784. Violence committed both by and against Amerindian groups, ironically,
cemented frontier settlers together in a way that no other issue did. Members of the court and
country parties feared that Virginia’s lackluster approach to western defense meant the state was
willing to forfeit its western land claims—making their Virginia-backed titles worthless. The
partisans, conversely, were upset that many of them had fought in the Revolution to defend those
very same claims and were left with little or no land. All three groups looked to the Virginia
statehouse for redress.37
Delegates attending the December 27, 1784, gathering were selected in the preceding
months by members of their respective militia companies—a fairly democratic process for the
day. It soon became clear that the partisans would have a slight advantage over their court and
country party counterparts when the assembly met in Danville. William Fleming, who hailed
from Lincoln County, was selected as the convention president and non-voting member Thomas
Perkins was appointed as clerk on the opening day of the meeting. The group met as committee
of the whole on December 29 to conduct an assessment of the district.38 Isaac Shelby was
appointed chairman of the committee and on the next day Caleb Wallace presented a list of
thirteen resolutions that had been compiled by a select committee formed the previous day. The
resolutions outlined the most pressing issues faced by the western population. Topping the list
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was a statement that addressed western security concerns—particularly, the inability of
frontiersmen to mount offensive strikes against antagonistic native groups. The committee
declared that an “Executive power” promptly be established in the district to authorize military
operations in times of emergency.39 The remaining resolutions addressed a wide range of issues,
including the misappropriation of surveying fees, problems with the court system, protection for
orphans and the poor, horse breeding regulations, the adoption of stray animals, and the need for
a western printer. 40
The convention met in this format a number of times before it formally adopted a series
of resolutions that mirrored those prepared by the sub-committee and presented by Caleb
Wallace nearly a week earlier. Conspicuously missing from the list was a statement regarding
militia laws or violent acts committed by Native groups. Most of the representatives believed
that a vote should be taken and another convention held to ensure that they acted on behalf of
their constituency. The second convention was slated for the fourth Monday in May 1785.
Delegates agreed that twenty-eight individuals should be selected to attend the meeting and
determined that representation in the convention would be based on population count to most
accurately represent the general populace.41 Delegates to the second convention were to be
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elected by popular vote during court days in April 1785; suffrage was not dependent upon
property ownership. Fayette County was awarded eight delegates and Jefferson and Lincoln
counties—allocated eight and twelve representatives, respectively—were subdivided into
election districts. The group adjourned on Wednesday, January 5, 1785, after voting to send
copies of the convention minutes to the highest ranking officer in each county “so that the
Inhabitants at large may know what their deputies have done in considering the Grievances that
came under their notice.”42
The Second and Third Conventions
Nelson County—home to large numbers of recent Maryland Catholic immigrants—was
carved from Lincoln County by the Virginia legislature before the April elections in early 1785.
The creation of another county posed a unique opportunity for the leader of the Jefferson County
partisans—John Campbell. Campbell and the partisans expected members of the court party to
vote against separation and feared that the statehood movement would be jeopardized without
their support. Campbell suggested that members of the court party hoped to control the
upcoming meeting by ensuring that the group held a majority of the convention seats. Campbell
pointed to the restructuring of the delegate selection process as proof and convinced the local
populace to elect twelve representatives from Jefferson County, rather than the eight allocated, to
attend the convention. Moreover, he secured the election of twelve partisans from Nelson
County—bringing the total number of delegates under his guise to twenty-four. Anticipating the
arrival of a combined twenty representatives from both Lincoln and Fayette counties, Campbell
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and the partisans expected to easily control the second statehood convention. Harry Innes wrote
in May 1785 that “we shall have no Convention this month…Col. Campbell has marred the
whole plan.”43
The second convention opened on May 23, 1785, with only the Fayette and Lincoln
County delegations in attendance; representatives from Jefferson and Nelson counties did not
arrive until May 27. George Muter, Benjamin Logan, Samuel McDowell, Harry Innes, and Caleb
Wallace were among the most notable court party members in attendance. James Wilkinson did
not attend the second meeting because of an illness. Samuel McDowell and Thomas Todd were
selected as convention president and clerk, respectively—positions the two held concurrently in
all but the first and ninth conventions. Two significant steps towards independence were taken
by members of the second convention, although neither directly resulted in the immediate
formation of an independent Kentucky. On May 31, 1785, delegates agreed to petition the
Virginia legislature for permission to form the state of Kentucky, which “ought to be taken into
union with the United States of America, and enjoy equal privileges in common with the said
states.”44 The petition read “that the remote situation of the district from the seat of government,
together with sundry other inconveniences, subjects the good people thereof to a number of
grievances too pressing to be longer borne, and which cannot be remedied whilst the district
continues a part of the state of Virginia.”45 The delegates made it clear that Kentuckians would
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no longer tolerate an unresponsive and removed government, maintaining that only the formation
of an independent state would ameliorate their situation in the West.46
Convention delegates also approved an address to the people of Kentucky that was later
distributed to the district court clerks and affixed to the doors of each respective court house. The
address largely mirrored the Declaration of Independence and was likely written by James
Wilkinson in advance of the meeting.47 The author listed a number of the most common
grievances lodged with the Virginia legislature, beginning with inadequate defenses against
Native American raiding parties. “We have no power to call out the militia, our sure and only
defence, to oppose the wicked machinations of the savages, unless in cases of actual invasion.”48
The address also cited communication difficulties, differing commercial interests, a distant
appeals court, the siphoning of western monies, and lack of a western executive power. The final
portion of the address explained that convention delegates sought reassurance from the western
populace before advancing the statehood movement. Elections were scheduled to take place
during the July court days. Humphrey Marshall and other members of the country party, still
fearing a redistribution of western land, continued to oppose statehood and saw the third
convention merely as a ploy to allow James Wilkinson the opportunity to speak in favor of
separation. Members of the court party likely hoped to control the third convention and position
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themselves in leadership roles as their influence continued to grow. Representation in the
convention would once more be determined by population count. Jefferson and Nelson Counties
were each allocated six representatives. Fayette and Lincoln Counties were charged with
selecting eight and ten delegates, respectively.49
Delegates to the third convention arrived in Danville on August 8, 1785. Court party
members filled the ranks of convention delegates, just as Humphrey Marshall and his cohort had
feared. Those in attendance included James Wilkinson, Caleb Wallace, George Muter, Benjamin
Sebastian, Harry Innes, and Benjamin Logan. Partisan leaders John Campbell and Ebenezer
Brooks were notably absent from the meeting after failing to win their bids for reelection.
Moreover, not a single member of the country party was in attendance—leaving the court party
in full control of the twenty-six member convention.50 Much of the convention business was
conducted in committee of the whole under the leadership of George Muter. Delegates
unanimously agreed that separation was in the best interest of their constituents and resolved to
apply for statehood. The resolution enumerated the oft-repeated list of injustices that plagued the
West and called for an act of separation “honourable to both and injurious to neither.”51

49

Littell, Political Transactions, 13–14, 63–66; Caleb Wallace to James Madison,
September 25, 1785, in The Papers of James Madison, 8:369–70; Brown, The Political
Beginnings of Kentucky, 63–69; “A Real Friend to the People” [Samuel Taylor], Kentucky
Gazette, April 25, 1789; “A Virginian” [Ebenezer Brooks], Kentucke Gazette, September 1,
1787; “A Farmer” [Harry Innes], Kentucke Gazette, October 18, 1788; Marshall, History of
Kentucky, 1:198–206.
50
Marshall, History of Kentucky, 1:207; Littell, Political Transactions, 14–15; For the
roster of delegates in attendance, see Collins and Collins, Collins’ Historical Sketches of
Kentucky, 1:354.
51
Resolution in Littell, Political Transactions, 68 (quotation); Brown, The Political
Beginnings of Kentucky, 69–70.
28

James Wilkinson wrote a new petition based on the approved, but undelivered, document
from the second convention.52 The address was more direct than the first but emphasized the
patience and care that punctuated the movement. Convention delegates acted with only the
“purest filial affection,” though they employed “the plain, manly, unadorned language of
independence, supported by conscious rectitude.”53 “They [district settlers] have patiently waited
the hour of redress, nor even ventured to raise their voices in their own cause until youth
quickening into manhood, hath given them vigour and stability,” the statement read.54 Similar
statements that highlighted the restraint and stoicism exhibited by westerners appeared in earlier
petitions as well—likely to lend credibility to the movement by identifying it as a prolonged
struggle that must soon be brought to a close. Delegates stressed the expediency of independence
and called for the passage of an act granting as much at the next gathering of the legislature.
George Muter and Harry Innes were charged to deliver the statement to Richmond and a similar
address was drafted to the citizens of the district. Caleb Wallace and other members of the court
party believed an independent Kentucky would soon be realized and began making preparations
throughout the fall to form a new state government—a government in which they fully expected
to hold key leadership positions.55
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Reflection
Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural
resources of the trans-Appalachian West, and, by the mid eighteenth century, the region was
consumed by unparalleled chaos. British officials struggled to maintain peace in the aftermath of
the Seven Years’ War as the settlement and development of the trans-Appalachian West
continued apace. Violent confrontations between Native groups and Euro-American settlers
became commonplace and soon defined everyday life in the region. Violence, committed both by
and against Native peoples, became a powerful unifying force for western settlers. Kentuckians
looked towards eastern governments and political leaders for assistance as the frequency of raids
against frontier settlements intensified after the outbreak of war in 1775. Most Kentuckians
became disillusioned by the inability or unwillingness of the state and national governments to
render assistance and some began to advocate separating from Virginia. These individuals
believed that an independent state would best be able to secure the financial and military
resources needed to ensure their protection. Delegates to the early statehood conventions focused
on security concerns and land redistribution issues and framed the separation movement in terms
of an East/West divide. Kentuckians, by speaking out against the Virginia and US governments,
shaped state and national policies towards Native Americans and played an important role in
identifying and critiquing the failings of the US government under the Articles of
Confederation.56

56

See Ward, Breaking the Backcountry; Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen; Dowd, War
under Heaven; Silver, Our Savage Neighbors; Griffin, American Leviathan; Horsman, The
Diplomacy of the New Republic; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion; Barksdale, “Introduction:
Kentucky and the Struggle for the Early American West,” 301.
30

CHAPTER TWO
“Vassals to the merciless Spaniards”
The prohibition of commerce on the Mississippi to the Americans has been a very wise measure,
the more so that it has reserved for Spain the power to confer this inestimable privilege (which
she may freely give) to a people who, if they enjoyed it without interruption, would not believe
themselves compelled to any recognition.
–James Wilkinson, first memorial, 178757
Spain dealt a particularly heavy blow to the western economy on June 26, 1784, by
closing the Mississippi River to American traffic. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their
crops to market and expected the United States to quickly negotiate the reopening of the
waterway. Kentuckians largely viewed the proposed Jay/Gardoqui agreement as a betrayal of
their natural right to the Mississippi River. The framing of the statehood movement began to
shift slightly from an East/West to North/South conflict as legislators from Virginia sided with
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river. Spain intended to use western
interest in the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. The
closure of the river, however, left Kentuckians in a unique position by placing them squarely
amidst the competition between the United States and Spain for control of the region. This
allowed some Kentuckians to leverage their allegiance to the United States in an attempt to
obtain personal profit and/or regional economic and military support from either nation.
Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive government and many,
such as former Continental Army officer James Wilkinson, intended to take action.58
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The River Closes
The statehood movement took an unexpected detour on June 26, 1784, when Spanish
officials closed the Mississippi River to American traffic. The river had been a source of
consternation for the young republic since the United States achieved independence and signed
the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Spanish officials did not endorse the agreement nor authorize the
proposed boundary that separated Spanish West Florida from the rest of Spain’s transAppalachian holdings. Spain refused to formally recognize the United States and the two
countries were left at a stalemate. US officials demanded that the Spanish allow free and
unobstructed navigation of the Mississippi River, grant trading rights to Spain’s South American
territories, and agree to a formal boundary fixed at the thirty-first parallel. Spanish negotiators
recognized that little would be gained from such an agreement and refused to concede to their
demands. Spain feared the effects of a burgeoning republic on the fringes of its New World
possessions and, like France and Britain, hoped to keep the young republic in a position of
dependency. Spanish authorities regarded their trans-Appalachian holdings as a buffer for
Spain’s valuable Mexican silver mines to the south. Preliminary negotiations between the two
governments quickly stalled and it became readily apparent that a clear divergence had emerged
between western and eastern interests in the United States. In fact, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the
French minister to the United States, reported as early as 1779 that US officials were not fully
devoted to ending Spain’s stranglehold on the western economy.59
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Trans-Appalachian settlers had long relied upon the Mississippi River to ship their goods
to market. River transport proved to be the lynchpin of the developing Kentucky commercial
economy, although, after the closure of the river, shipments hinged upon the interpretation of
imperial instructions by local Spanish administrators. Substantial portions of western crops were
intermittently shipped downstream in lieu of Spanish regulations. The cultivation of Kentucky
tobacco and corn, however, declined significantly because the difficult journey to Atlantic
markets proved unprofitable and nearly impossible for Kentucky planters who were unable to
ship their crops to New Orleans. Tobacco became an acceptable form of currency in 1787 as part
of Virginia’s efforts to stimulate the western economy. The leaf was widely offered and accepted
as payment of tax debt and eventually surpassed skins as the preferred currency in the region.
Smallholders, though they did not wish to recreate the hierarchical social structure of eastern
Virginia, also supported this move because tobacco proved to be so profitable.60
Spanish Minister Diego de Gardoqui arrived in North America in mid-1785 with clear
orders not to offer the Americans use of the river. He could, however, concede a boundary at the
thirty-first parallel if absolutely necessary. Gardoqui, an experienced and highly respected
diplomat, was well versed in American affairs. He served as an intermediary between US
diplomat John Jay and Count of Floridablanca José Moñino Redondo during the American
Revolution and intimately understood Spanish-American trade relations. Gardoqui’s arrival was
highly anticipated by congressional leaders. “We expect him soon here so that we shall quickly
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know whether he can or will do anything conclusive concerning the Navigation of [the]
Mississippi [River],” wrote Virginian Richard Henry Lee.61 Gardoqui stressed the necessity of
maintaining open negotiations concerning the river but remained acutely aware of the
backcountry desire to obtain access to western waters, which he used as a powerful bargaining
chip in negotiations with the United States. The Spanish plenipotentiary quickly confirmed what
officials in Madrid anticipated. A clear separation of interests had emerged between the eastern
and western United States.62
Several issues lay at the heart of the national government’s reluctance to press for the
opening of the Mississippi River. Western interests certainly did not take precedence during the
American fight for independence and, after the war, eastern officials attempted to protect the
young republic by mitigating unfettered western settlement. Gouverneur Morris, a New York
statesman, explained that open access to the port of New Orleans would depopulate the East and
strip its people of wealth. Virginia congressman William Grayson believed that “we [easterners]
will lose our importance, and become as nothing in the scale of nations.”63 Prominent Federalist
Rufus King cautioned his fellow members of Congress in August 1786. “Should we embarrass
ourselves in the attempts of imprudent men to navigate the Mississippi below the northern
boundary of Florida, we can expect no favors from the Spanish government.”64 King was likely
referring to a limited trade agreement with Spain. Even some southern legislatures espoused
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moderated and controlled westward expansion. These men joined with their northern
counterparts to pass the Land Ordinance of 1785, the Indian Ordinance of 1786, and the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 in an effort to stem the growth of the nation.65
On July 14, 1786, well over a year after the closure of the river, Gardoqui formally
addressed Congress. The assembly appointed John Jay, of New York, as Gardoqui’s diplomatic
counterpart, ordering him “to negotiate, treat, and sign with Don Diego Gardoqui…whatever
Articles, Compacts and Conventions may be necessary for fixing the boundaries between the
Territories of the United States and those of his Catholic Majesty and for promoting the general
harmony and mutual interest of the two Nations.”66 Jay, then secretary of foreign affairs, was
directed to obtain congressional approval of all agreements reached between the two men and
instructed not to forgo navigation rights to the Mississippi River under any circumstances. He
strongly opposed reopening the river because he perceived no commercial advantage in securing
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its navigation and actively lobbied Congress to revise his instructions. It soon became evident
that gaining access to markets in Spanish South America was Jay’s ultimate goal.67
Gardoqui and Jay settled upon a limited trade agreement that allowed for exchanges
between the United States and Spain after Jay’s directions were modified in late 1786. However,
the proposed settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the Mississippi River
for a period of twenty-five to thirty years. Western leaders strongly opposed the agreement. A
Kentuckian explained in December 1786 that “the late commercial treaty with Spain has given
the western Country an [sic] universal shock, and struck its Inhabitants with an amazement.”68
Less than two months later George Muter declared in February 1787 that he had “not mett [sic]
one man, who would be willing to give the navigation up, for ever so short a time, on any terms
whatever.”69 Kentuckians, particularly Muter and fellow court party members, were enraged by
the closure of the Mississippi River and quickly elevated the situation to the top of their list of
grievances against the national government. Spain, in closing the river, afforded itself yet another
opportunity to preclude the development of the United States and stem the tide of western
expansion. Spanish officials found themselves in a unique situation as the national government
bore the brunt of the blame for the act. Spain could negotiate largely on its own terms with
whomever it wanted. Spain’s willingness to hold talks outside official diplomatic channels was a
significant boon to the Kentucky separatist movement. Spanish interest in the region presented
an opportunity for some Kentuckians, particularly members of the court party, to leverage their
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allegiance to the United States in an attempt to acquire the economic and military resources that
the national government had so far failed to provide.70
A New England Conspiracy
The projected Jay/Gardoqui agreement fueled rumors of conspiracy and became a
powerful catalyst for separatist movements across the backcountry. Some, like Louisville
resident Thomas Green, proposed that western leaders take matters into their own hands, perhaps
to force the national government to act. Green intended to raise a large number of troops and
send them under the command of General George Rogers Clark against the Spanish at Natchez.71
The men planned to settle the land they claimed in accordance with the laws of Georgia and
hoped to gain the support of local Amerindian groups, who relied upon Spain for trade goods and
supplies, by offering them provisions. In a December 1786 circular, almost certainly written by
Green himself, the author described the shock experienced by backcountry residents as news of
the Jay-Gardoqui agreement spread. Green questioned the legitimacy of the American
Revolution in the West and cautioned against making westerners “vassals to the merciless
Spaniards.”72 Westerners, he lamented, found themselves at the mercy of Spain once their goods
were sent downriver to New Orleans—a sentiment shared almost universally across Kentucky.
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Large quantities of produce were often confiscated by corrupt Spanish officials; at other times,
Kentucky merchants were forced to sell their goods at low, non-negotiable prices.73
Green questioned the trade benefits that easterners hoped to reap from the proposed
treaty and cautioned against losing additional European markets. “The Spaniards, from the
amazing resources of this river, can supply all their own markets at a much lower price than you
[eastern merchants] possibly can,” the author lamented.74 The final sentences of the circular took
a much more radical stance. The author compared the relationship between westerners and the
national government to that of the United States and Great Britain before the outbreak of war in
1775. Green maintained that Great Britain was receptive to western overtures to rejoin the
British Empire and threatened that the West would become a powerful force to reckon with in
that event. The final line of the work succinctly expressed the sentiment of most backcountry
residents: “these hints, if rightly improved, may be of some service; if not, blame yourselves
[government officials] for the neglect.”75 Green was clear that Kentuckians would no longer
tolerate a distant and unresponsive government: if US leaders didn’t act soon, westerners would.
Great Britain and Spain found ample opportunity to exploit the tense political climate of the
trans-Appalachian West and approached men like Green with tempting offers aimed at further
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alienating the western populace from the national government. Green’s warning suggested that
some westerners might have been more receptive to those overtures than others.76
Some well-known politicians from Virginia proper believed that the proposed forfeiture
of the Mississippi River was the cornerstone of a northeastern plot to dismantle the national
government and halt the expansion of the West. Congressman James Monroe, for example,
asserted that long-term loss of the river would preclude the development of the backcountry by
denying the existing southern states a clearly defined frontier. “The object in the occlusion of the
Mississippi on the part of these people… is to break up so far as this will do it, the settlements on
the western waters, prevent any in future [sic], and thereby keep the States southwd. as they now
are,” lamented Monroe in August 1786.77 Former governor Patrick Henry fervently pushed for
the opening of the river, no matter the consequences. “[I] would rather part with the
confederation than relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi,” Henry declared in late 1787.78
Others, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, feared total separation of the eastern
and western United States. “If they [westerners] declare themselves a separate people,” warned
Jefferson, “we are incapable of a single effort to retain them.”79 It was clear to Madison,
Jefferson, and the others that the Mississippi River question was tied not only to the expansion of
the West, but, by extension, the very balance of power that existed between the northern and
southern states themselves. The development of the West and the formation of western states
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hinged upon access to the Mississippi River. Securing the navigation of the river, in effect, meant
an inevitable change in the power wielded by one bloc of states over another.80
Kentucky delegates to the Virginia General Assembly drafted a memorial to the entire
legislative body on November 17, 1786. The men expressed great alarm at the anticipated
surrender of the river and explained that they hoped to “make known to the Legislature their
apprehensions of the evils which must necessarily result from so unconstitutional and dangerous
a measure.”81 The men stated that it was nearly impossible for westerners to find another route to
get their produce to market because of the difficulty of the western terrain and explained that
their livelihood depended upon access to the waters of the Mississippi River. The memorialists
struggled to reconcile the images, symbols, and language of the American Revolution with the
current situation in the West.
“Born and educated under our common gov’t and attached to it by the strongest
Ties of Interest & affection, having equally participated in the hardships &
dangers of the Revolution and being equally entitled to its benefits, they
[westerners] cannot but receive with horror the Idea of their being thus sacrificed,
and their interests sold by those they have considered as their brethren, friends, &
fellow-citizens,”

the memorial read.82 The men questioned how the western populace would react when they
learned that they had been denied access to the Mississippi River, not by the policies of Spain,
but by their own government. Never in history has such an agreement been formed that “shut the
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Doors of Commerce” to a portion of a country’s citizens for the benefit of the other, the
memorialists lamented.83 “How subversive & abhorrent therefore must such a project be to the
mild and free spirit of our federal constitution.”84
In response, the Virginia legislature passed a series of resolutions in the final days of
1786 that addressed the memorialists’ concerns. Navigation rights to the Mississippi River, the
lawmakers concurred, should be considered “as the bountiful gift of nature to the United
States.”85 The assembly maintained that the Jay-Gardoqui agreement did not align with the spirit
of the country and stood as “a flagrant violation of justice… and an alarming innovation on the
system of the Union.”86 A copy of the memorial was sent to Virginia’s congressional
representatives in New York with instructions to oppose the passage of the Jay/Gardoqui
agreement. John Marshall wrote of the resolutions: “the negotiation which has been opened with
Spain, for ceding the navigation of the Mississippi—a negociation [sic] so dishonourable and
injurious to America, so destructive of the natural rights of the western world, is warmly opposed
by this country.”87 Marshall continued, explaining that “for this purpose the most pointed
instructions are given to our delegates in congress. I persuade myself that this negociation [sic]
will terminate in securing, instead of ceding that great point.”88 These resolutions likely helped to
cool secessionist sentiment when details of the agreement reached Kentucky in early 1787. The
Virginia legislature, for the moment at least, finally seemed in tune with the concerns of the
western inhabitants. A slight shift in the framing of the Kentucky statehood movement began to
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occur—from an East/West to North/South divide—as the separatist effort gained traction and
centered upon a national government seemingly unconcerned with the Mississippi River and
western trade. James Monroe later recalled that “the animated pursuit that was made of this
object, required, and I believe received, as firm an opposition. The southern states were on their
guard, and warmly opposed it.”89
News of the Jay-Gardoqui agreement was slow to spread because of the limited reach of
the early American media network, though it is highly likely that well-connected Kentuckians
knew of the accord and the subsequent resolutions well before the details became widespread in
March 1787. Court party leaders George Muter, Harry Innes, John Brown, and Benjamin
Sebastian, ostensibly alarmed by the contents of the communiqué, hastily assembled and drafted
a circular that was released to the general populace on March 29, 1787. The men called for an
extralegal meeting, to be held in Danville on the first Monday in May, to discuss the most recent
developments regarding the closure of the Mississippi River. Innes and his compatriots held high
expectations for the impromptu assembly and prepared an equally ambitious agenda. Those in
attendance were to prepare a remonstrance to Congress, establish a committee of
correspondence, appoint representatives to confer with delegates of other western districts (if
deemed necessary), and “to adopt such other measures, as shall be conducive to our
happiness.”90
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Sebastian, Innes, and the others believed that forfeiture of the river would largely destroy
the western economy and called for similar measures to be written across the backcountry. “This
is a subject that requires no comment—the injustice of the measure is glaring—and as the
inhabitants of this district wish to unite their efforts, to oppose the cession of the navigation of
the Mississippi, with those of their brethren residing on the western waters,” the circular read.91
The men again adapted the rhetoric of the American Revolution to frame their attack against the
agreement. The resulting language effectively evoked the most basic principles of the
Revolution—the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—while highlighting the
disparity that had arisen between westerners and those very notions:
we hope to see such an exertion made, upon this important occasion, as may
convince Congress that the inhabitants of the western country are united in the
opposition, and consider themselves entitled to all the privileges of freemen, and
those blessings procured by the revolution; and will not tamely submit to an act of
oppression, which would tend to a deprivation of our just rights and privileges.92
Harry Innes anticipated the formation of an independent western government. “I am
decidedly of opinion that this western country will, in a few years, Revolt from the Union and
endeavor to erect an Independent Government,” he wrote in July 1787.93 “For, under the present
system, we can not exert our strength, neither does Congress seem disposed to protect us.”94 The
national government’s will and ability to adequately provide economic and security resources to
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the West reached an all-time low with the proposed Jay-Gardoqui agreement, something that
Innes and members of the court party hoped to exploit in order to hasten the separation process.
These men reasoned that Kentucky should form an independent government and unilaterally
separate from Virginia—with the implication that it may or may not join the union if Spain
offered better terms (e.g., access to the Mississippi River). Court party leaders skillfully
positioned themselves at the head of the Mississippi River question and hoped to use the issue to
take control of the statehood movement.95
For some, western independence was much closer at hand. James Wilkinson, an
inveterate schemer, worked to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish empire in what became known
as the Spanish Conspiracy. Wilkinson was born in 1757 and educated as a physician at the
College of Philadelphia before departing for Kentucky in December 1783 as the spokesperson
for Barclay, Moylan, & Co., a Philadelphia trading firm. Wilkinson hoped to leverage his
allegiance to the United States (and that of his fellow Kentuckians) to obtain personal profit
and/or regional economic and military support following the closure of the Mississippi River. He
embarked for New Orleans in April 1787, and, once there, met with Louisiana governor Esteban
Rodríguez Miró. Wilkinson formally outlined his plan to bring Kentucky into the Spanish empire
in his first memorial before leaving for Charleston, South Carolina, later that year.96
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Kentuckians, Wilkinson wrote, considered access to the Mississippi River an
“indispensable” right and initially viewed the closure of the lower portion of the river in 1784 as
a temporary problem—a formality in negotiations between the United States and Spain.97 The
continued failure of Congress to secure that right, and Spain’s determined assertion of exclusive
navigation rights to the river, “filled the new Settlements with anxiety, cooled the hopes of those
whose aims were directed towards the west, and removed the motives that originated these
settlements.”98 Wilkinson explained that, in light of recent developments in negotiations between
the United States and Spain, “Kentucky is taking measures for its own safety” and has applied
for separation from Virginia to form an independent state.99 “They [Kentuckians] establish
circumstantially their right as a member of the federative Union and expressly declare that if
Congress does not protect and sustain them in this desire it must consider the ties of their fidelity
dissolved, they remaining at liberty to provide for their own conservation.”100
Wilkinson believed it would be difficult for Spain to “perpetually resist” western designs
upon the Mississippi River and questioned the practicality of an extended conflict with American
settlers in the region.101 He estimated that upwards of ten thousand troops would be required to
adequately defend Louisiana against American forces. “When Spain is exhausted of men and
treasure, the Americans, like a detained torrent that has accumulated prodigious weight, will
break all impediments, and desolating whatever they find in their path, sweep all resistance to the
Gulf,” Wilkinson wrote.102 Wilkinson promoted Kentucky as “a permanent barrier” to the United
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States and Great Britain and promised to sway Kentuckians to the Spanish crown. He maintained
that Gardoqui must continue to oppose any agreements allowing for the opening of the
Mississippi River to US traffic, explaining that: “the prohibition of commerce on the Mississippi
to the Americans has been a very wise measure, the more so that it has reserved for Spain the
power to confer this inestimable privilege (which she may freely give) to a people who, if they
had enjoyed it without interruption, would not believe themselves compelled to any
recognition.”103
Wilkinson recognized that the closure of the Mississippi River was a political boon to
Kentucky as well as to Spain. Spain’s actions positioned Kentuckians squarely between the two
competing powers, and many, including Wilkinson, naturally hoped to benefit from that situation
by leveraging their allegiance to the United States. Wilkinson, though he likely overstated his
influence, was not alone in attempting to strike a deal with the Spanish government. Between
1786 and 1795, at least fourteen western leaders entered into negotiations with Spain or another
European power to separate from the union. Wilkinson and other western elites operated in a
highly contested region amidst great political, economic, and social uncertainty, and, as historian
Susan Gaunt Stearns rightly points out, their actions must be viewed within that context. That
Spain was willing to negotiate with Wilkinson, outside official diplomatic channels, is
illustrative of the influence that he and other western leaders wielded in the region and speaks to
the importance of Kentucky, and the large trans-Appalachian West, in international matters.104
For his services, Wilkinson requested a position within the Spanish government, a royal
pension, and a western trade monopoly. “If this proposition is admitted,” Wilkinson wrote, “I
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will be ready to receive instructions from the Government [Spain], and return to Kentucky by the
shortest and surest route, and on the way I will establish a confidential correspondence near
Congress that will regularly procure for me information as to all the measures that may in any
way have relation with our affair.”105 Miró deferred Wilkinson’s request to Madrid, but granted
him permission to sell up to $37,000 of produce in New Orleans. It took nearly a year to get a
response from Spain and Wilkinson profited immensely from the trade deal during the
intersession. Wilkinson’s scheme quickly unraveled, however, after secessionist sentiment
cooled considerably following the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789.106
Reflection
The Mississippi River was an integral part of the developing western economy.
Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their crops to market, and, after learning that Spain had
closed the lower portion of the river to American traffic, expected the United States to quickly
negotiate the reopening of the waterway. Most Kentuckians considered access to the Mississippi
River to be a natural right, and were shocked when they learned that the proposed Jay/Gardoqui
agreement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five
to thirty years. The statehood movement began to be reframed as a North/South conflict after
legislators from Virginia sided with Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the
river. Spain hoped to use western interest in the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in
negotiations with the United States. The closure of the river, however, elevated the importance of
Kentucky and its peoples to both nations and allowed some Kentuckians to leverage their
allegiance to the United States in an attempt to obtain personal profit and/or regional economic
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and military support from either nation. Some Kentuckians, like Thomas Green and James
Wilkinson, intended to take action when the national government would not.107
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CHAPTER 3
“Congress will never fail to find an excuse”
There is reason to believe that the event may depend on the Kentucky members, who seem to lean
more against than in favor of the Constitution. The business is in the most ticklish state that can
be imagined. The majority will certainly be very small on whatever side it may finally lie; and I
dare not encourage much expectation that it will be on the favorable side.
–James Madison to George Washington, June 13, 1788108
The national debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were shaped by
the arguments made by people in the West. Many Kentuckians believed the new government
would make it easier for the Atlantic states to cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain and
questioned the rationale behind the new system. James Madison expected Kentucky delegates to
play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to gain their support.
Madison assured Kentuckians that navigation rights to the river would become a national issue
under the new government and explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and enact
laws that negatively affected the region. He also cited trade benefits for both the western and
Atlantic states in his defense of the proposed government. Kentucky delegates, not actively
participating in the convention debates, did not play the pivotal role that Madison expected.
Kentuckians, nonetheless, played a significant role in shaping the new government by joining
fellow westerners in demanding a government that was attentive and responsive to their needs.
The Kentucky statehood movement was likewise shaped by the ongoing constitutional debates.
Questioning what the new government would look like, and unsure if that system would be more
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successful in meeting their needs, some Kentuckians began to see unilateral separation from both
Virginia and the union as a viable option.109
More Conventions
Kentuckians assembled in convention four times between September 1786 and November
1788. Following the close of the third convention, George Muter and Harry Innes traveled to
Richmond and diligently worked to ensure the passage of an act by the Virginia legislature that
would enable Kentucky to separate. The duo met little resistance from the legislature and
successfully secured the passage of the bill, which was approved by the House on January 6,
1786, and the Senate on January 10. The legislation was known as the Virginia Enabling Act and
was signed by the governor six days later on January 16, 1786. The act called for another
convention to be held in Danville “to determine whether it be expedient for, and the will of the
good people of the said district, that the same be erected into an independent state.”110 The
legislation required that the September 1786 convention unconditionally accept all of the terms
outlined within the document before a date of independence—after September 1, 1787—could
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be established. Virginia legislators also stipulated that the national government admit Kentucky
into the union and release Virginia from any pending obligations concerning the district before
June 1, 1787. Elections were scheduled for August and those selected to attend the fourth
convention were directed to assemble in Danville on the fourth Monday in September. Members
of the country party favored the act because it protected their valuable land claims. The partisans,
originally supportive of immediate separation, reversed their position and now began to oppose
the movement once it became clear that a redistribution of western land would not occur. These
men, growing more conscious of the power and influence Virginia wielded in national affairs,
now began to claim that Kentuckians could only gain access to the Mississippi River by
remaining tied to Virginia, with the full support of the state’s legislature behind them. Court
party leaders were not satisfied with the document and lamented the scheduling of a fourth
convention. Many within the group began to seriously consider unconditional separation from
Virginia and it was at this moment that James Wilkinson became the face of the party.111
The delegates elected to attend the fourth convention met on September 26, 1786, but
were unable to form a quorum for several months. Many of the men had embarked with
Benjamin Logan and General George Rogers Clark to attack the neighboring Wabash and
Shawnee tribes. The convention reconvened periodically throughout the fall of 1786 before a
quorum was finally reached in January 1787. The Virginia legislature, however, passed a second
Enabling Act in the meantime that called for another convention because the deadline of the first
act had expired. The new legislation stipulated that separation occur no later than January 1,
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1789, and that Congress grant its approval by July 4, 1788.112 The fifth Kentucky statehood
convention convened on September 17, 1787, and by September 22 the delegates had accepted
the terms of the Second Enabling Act. Harry Innes, Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and
other leading members of the court party once again dominated the proceedings. Delegates
requested that the state be quickly accepted into the Confederation and that Virginia send a
member from the district to New York as part of the state’s delegation to Congress. Moreover,
the fifth convention set an April 1788 election for delegates to attend a July constitutional
convention, which would be tasked with writing a constitution for the new state. Most
Kentuckians now believed that statehood was imminent.113
The sixth statehood convention, scheduled to convene in Danville on July 28, 1788, was
dealt a particularly heavy blow when the Confederation Congress declined to admit Kentucky to
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the union because a new federal government would soon come into existence under the
Constitution of 1787. Delegates assembled at the statehood convention were shocked when news
of the latest congressional action arrived. Court party leaders were frustrated that Virginia would
yet again have to grant permission for the district to become an independent state. Caleb Wallace
and James Wilkinson, among others, believed that the system was flawed and openly called for
the convention to continue extralegally. Wallace declared “that it was the duty of this
Convention as the Representatives of the people to proceed to frame a Constitution of
Government for this District and to submit the same to their consideration with such advice
relative thereto as emergency suggests.”114 Wallace may have perceived the situation to be a true
emergency for Kentucky. Years of petitioning and assembling had yielded few tangible results
and the Kentucky delegates now found themselves seemingly back at the beginning—a third
Enabling Act would need to be passed by the Virginia legislature, another convention held in
Danville, and a petition once again sent to Congress requesting permission to join the new
nation. Though many court party members openly challenged the congressional decision,
country party leader John Edwards supported the action and moved that the matter be referred to
their constituents. One member of the partisans suggested that militia captains poll their men to
gauge the public’s sentiment. However, the convention ultimately decided to assemble for a
seventh time on the first Monday in November 1788. Kentuckians once again found themselves
at the mercy of the Virginia state legislature and the national government.115
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The seventh statehood convention came at a critical juncture for Kentuckians.
Secessionist sentiment undoubtedly ran high after Kentucky was denied admission into the
national compact. Statehood proponents, especially members of the court party, found the
western populace most receptive to unilateral separation from both Virginia and the national
government. Caleb Wallace wrote in August 1788 that “our most discerning men are of opinion
that Congress will never fail to find an excuse” to deny Kentuckians their sovereignty.116
Members of the court, country, and partisan parties publically debated one another in the
Kentucke Gazette during the weeks leading to the meeting. Partisan Ebenezer Brooks, writing as
“Cornplanter,” cautioned that extralegal separation from Virginia would reduce the chance of
gaining access to the Mississippi River. “Separation on any terms, especially if assumed without
the concurrence of Congress, would be the most effectual barr [sic] against a free trade through
the Mississippi,” Brooks argued.117 Brooks also considered the power and influence that Virginia
wielded in national affairs and questioned the practicability of separation, pointing to “our
present superior weight in the scale of Congress by our connection with the most considerable
state in the Union.”118 Brooks and the partisans, still hoping to indefinitely postpone separation,
spoke against the military efficacy of independence and argued that statehood would require an
increase in taxation (via a general tax) to operate the government. Harry Innes and the court
party countered that the movement was defined by strong public support and lamented that “the
nose of the poor has been held to the grindstone of oppression in this District”—though neither
the court nor country parties had been sympathetic to, and still continued to oppose, the partisan
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cause.119 The convention had been granted broad powers by delegates of the sixth assembly “to
take such measures for obtaining admission of the District as a separate and independent member
of the United States of America, and the navigation of the river Mississippi, as may appear most
conducive to those important purposes.”120 Moreover, the convention would retain power from
November 1788 to January 1790 if another meeting needed to be called.121
Delegates to the seventh statehood convention assembled in quorum on November 4,
1788. Controversy arose when members of the country party insisted that the convention merely
petition Virginia, yet again, to form an independent state. James Wilkinson, elected chairmen of
the committee of the whole on November 5, maintained that the assembly was authorized to both
declare independence and draft a constitution without any additional approval. Wilkinson and his
associates sought to exploit the tense political situation and at least purported to steer the
budding state into the arms of Spain. Delegates from Mercer and Madison counties delivered two
petitions to the committee of the whole that implored the convention to draft “a spirited and
manly address [that] should be sent to Congress, to obtain the navigation of the Mississippi.”122
Members of the court party remained steadfast in their belief that only an independent Kentucky
could secure access to the river, citing the abysmal failure of negotiations between the United
States and Spain as proof. Wilkinson proved unable to sway the convention delegates despite
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lengthy diatribes that highlighted the importance of the river to the district and outlined his
involvement with Spanish officials in New Orleans. The Mississippi River, he exclaimed, was
“the object upon which are based all hopes of worldly happiness, and without which poverty and
misery will be their [westerners’] only fate.”123 He continued, “I speak with certainty when I say
they will take up any proposition, no matter how desperate, in a cause of the utmost importance
to them and their posterity.”124 Committees were organized on November 6-7 to draft addresses
to both Congress and the Virginia General Assembly requesting Kentucky’s independence and
admission into the union. Convention delegates scheduled an eighth meeting for July 1789.
Complicating matters, the Virginia legislature passed a third Enabling Act four days after the
Christmas holiday that was to be reviewed at the upcoming meeting. Kentuckians later learned
that these terms were substantially different than those outlined in the second act and approved
by the fifth statehood convention in September 1787.125
A Nation Divided
The national debates surrounding the ratification of the newly drafted US Constitution
were affected by the tenor of the arguments made by people in the West. Members of the
Danville Political Club scrutinized the new governmental system at their Saturday evening
meetings and identified what they believed were deficiencies within the new plan. A number of

Wilkinson quoted in “Wilkinson’s Memorial and Expatriation Declaration” in
Reprints of Littell, cxxiii.
124
Wilkinson quoted in “Wilkinson’s Memorial and Expatriation Declaration” in
Reprints of Littell, cxxiii.
125
Littell, Political Transactions, 29–32; Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky,
218; Marshall, History of Kentucky, 1:316–43; Samuel McDowell to James Wilkinson,
November 12, 1788, DC 33 J 133; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 54–57; Harrison and
Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 60; Watlington, The Partisan Spirit, 175–82; Harrison,
Kentucky’s Road to Statehood, 66–72. See also “Harry Innes versus Humphrey Marshall:
depositions, 1809–1815,” Durrett Collection, UC.
123

56

the club’s members, including Harry Innes, George Muter, Benjamin Sebastian, Samuel
McDowell, and John Brown, questioned the role of the Kentucky militia in the new federal
system. Club members were concerned that Kentucky’s militia units might be on expedition in a
neighboring state and, therefore, unavailable to defend the state’s residents from Amerindian
attacks. The president’s role in calling out the militia, the office of vice president, the omission
of a declaration of rights, and jurisdiction over docks, arsenals, forts, and the new federal city,
among others, arose as points of contention as well. Caleb Wallace, eager to promote Kentucky’s
domestic manufactures, complained that “under this New Government Imports and Exports
cannot be taxed nor prohibited without the consent of Congress.”126 Concerns regarding power
and representation in the new government largely framed the members’ reading of the
Constitution. Harry Innes noted the important role that he expected the Senate to play in
maintaining the balance of power between the states. “Ninety-nine men out of a hundred
possessed of power will abuse it. Without a senate, one State will have a power of imposing on
another, one having a greater number of representatives. A senate in this case would be a very
popular check.”127
Kentuckians were largely suspicious of the proposed government and believed that
ratification of the document would make it easier for the Atlantic states to cede control of the
Mississippi River to Spain. The vote at the Virginia ratification convention—scheduled to begin
on June 2, 1788—was expected to be decidedly close. Future Kentucky attorney general George
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Nicholas wrote to James Madison on April 5, 1788, that “the only danger I apprehend is from the
Kentucky members, and one consideration only has any weight with them; a fear that if the new
government should take place, that their navigation would be given up.”128 Madison anxiously
wrote to George Washington on June 13, 1788, that “there is reason to believe that the event may
depend on the Kentucky members, who seem to lean more against than in favor of the
Constitution. The business is in the most ticklish state that can be imagined.”129
Madison bluntly addressed the Mississippi River question in debates about the new
Constitution, explaining that the navigation of the river would no longer be viewed as a regional,
but rather as a national, matter once the new government was in place. Madison assured
westerners that the inclination of the Atlantic states to cede the Mississippi River would no
longer be an issue. “If we try the danger to the Mississippi under the old and under the new
system by comparing them in relation to their principle, the friends of the Mississippi cannot
hesitate to embrace the latter,” he wrote.130 Madison believed that westerners would have a much
more powerful voice in the new federal legislature, which required a simple majority to pass
legislation. He explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and enact laws that
negatively affected the region and also cited trade benefits for both the western and Atlantic
states. Madison maintained that the reopening of the Mississippi River would stimulate the
western economy and serve as a market for eastern merchants. He also reassured westerners that
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all proposed accords required both presidential and Senate approval before any treaties, such as
the Jay/Gardoqui agreement, could be enacted.131
Madison and the Federalists eagerly awaited the start of the Virginia ratification
convention in June and remained keenly aware of the important role that delegates from
Kentucky were expected to play.132 Fourteen delegates represented Kentucky at the
convention—the majority of whom opposed ratification. The Kentucky delegates did not actively
participate in the debates and, in the end, did not play as important a role as expected. The final
vote was eighty-nine to seventy-nine in favor of ratification. Three members of the Kentucky
delegation—Robert Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and Rice Bullock—voted with the
majority. The other ten voted against ratification and one delegate, Noltey Conn of Bourbon
County, either abstained or was not present for the vote. Madison had enlisted the support of
Congressman John Brown in the months preceding the ratification convention to help secure the
Kentucky vote. “I have written several letters since my arrival to correspondents in the district
[Kentucky] with a view to counteract anti-federal machinations,” explained Madison in a letter to
George Washington.133 “I have little expectation however that they will have much effect, unless
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the communication they might call from Mr. Brown in Congress, should happen to breathe the
same spirit.”134
Brown had been appointed to the Virginia delegation to Congress in 1787 with special
directions to shepherd Kentucky’s admission into the union. Diego de Gardoqui, hoping to draw
Kentucky into the Spanish empire, propositioned Brown after Kentucky was denied admission
into the national compact in July 1788. Gardoqui offered free and unrestricted access to the
Mississippi River if Kentuckians agreed to separate from the union and appoint someone to
negotiate with the Spanish government. Gardoqui recounted the meeting to his superiors in
Madrid, noting that “I carefully observed his appearance as I told him this, and it seemed to me
that I could discern the satisfaction it gave. He said he would reflect upon it and would see me
and talk at leisure upon the subject.”135 Brown, writing to George Muter, outlined the offer and
explained that “there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this declaration.”136 He implored
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Muter and “a few confidential friends in the district” to “make a prudent use of the information
which is in part confirmed by dispatches yesterday received by Congress from Mr. Carmichael,
our minister at that court [Spain], the contents of which I am not at liberty to disclose.”137
Gardoqui’s overture to Brown during the summer of 1788 underscores the political
instability of Kentucky and the larger trans-Appalachian West during the 1780s. At this critical
point—following the denial of the national compact by the Confederation Congress—
Kentuckians could have unilaterally separated from the United States and joined with Spain or
Great Britain. Both hoped to stymie the development and expansion of the United States in hopes
of furthering their own territorial and economic prospects in North America. Yet when James
Wilkinson called John Brown to the floor of the seventh statehood convention (November 1788)
to discuss Gardoqui’s offer, the congressman’s lackluster remarks largely turned the tide of the
meeting and cooled any remaining secessionist sentiment. Many Kentuckians questioned the
rationale for the new government, but most remained committed to the union. Despite some talk
of secession from the United States, it was clear that an independent Kentucky would only exist
as part of the United States. The only question remaining was, when?138
Reflection
Kentuckians actively shaped the national debates concerning the ratification of the US
Constitution. Many Kentuckians believed that the new system would make it easier for the
Atlantic states to forfeit the Mississippi River to Spain, and thus were suspicious of the proposed
government. James Madison anticipated that Kentucky delegates might determine the outcome

137

Green, The Spanish Conspiracy, 172 (quotations).
Littell, Political Transactions, 26; Reprints of Littell, xxii, xxv–xxvi; Watlington, The
Partisan Spirit, 130, 159–64, 175–82; Harrison, Kentucky’s Road to Statehood, 56–57, 66–72;
Green, The Spanish Conspiracy, 156–63; Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky, 144–48;
Collins and Collins, Collins’ Historical Sketches of Kentucky, 1:21–22, 266–67.
138

61

of the vote at the Virginia ratification convention and worked to gain their support. Madison
assured Kentuckians that access to the river would become a national issue, rather than a regional
one, under the new government. He cited trade benefits for both the western and Atlantic states
in his defense of the new system and explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and
enact laws that negatively affected the region. The degree to which Kentuckians shaped the
ongoing constitutional debates is significant. The important role that Kentucky delegates were
expected to play, and the attention paid towards gaining their support, speaks to the reach and
influence of Kentucky and its political leaders during the early national period. The Kentucky
statehood movement was likewise shaped by the ongoing constitutional debates. Some
Kentuckians began to see unilateral separation from both Virginia and the union as a viable
option when faced with the prospect of a new and unfamiliar governmental system.139
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CHAPTER 4
“Injustice is necessary for our prosperity and happiness?”
If slavery is not consistent with justice, it must be inconsistent with good policy. For who would
venture to assert that it would be good policy for us to erect a public monument of our injustice,
and that injustice is necessary for our prosperity and happiness? That old proverb, that honesty
is the best policy, ought not to be despised for its age.
–Rev. David Rice, Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy, 1792140
The final statehood conventions (numbers eight through ten) largely determined what the
new Kentucky state government would look like. Kentuckians were particularly divided over
which courts should hold jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. The right to hold slaves emerged
as the most contentious issue discussed at the final statehood convention. Proponents of the
institution argued that the Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the private property
rights of slave owners. Convention delegates, in the end, voted to allow slaveholding in the new
state, despite the efforts of an antislavery faction led by Presbyterian minister David Rice.
Kentucky officially became a state on June 1, 1792, and a plantation and slave-based economy
defined much of the state by the late 1790s. The integration of political and economic systems
bolstered the gentry’s foothold in the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky
frontier. Slaveholders across the United States gained an important victory with the ratification
of the 1792 constitution—precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West.141
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Statehood Achieved
Delegates who assembled in convention on July 20, 1789, were largely inexperienced in
state-making. More than twenty of those elected had never attended any of the seven previous
sessions. Members of the court party were noticeably absent from the eighth convention after
failing to win their bids for reelection; thus, the majority of delegates present represented either
the partisans or the country party. Samuel McDowell, however, was once again elected president
of the meeting and Thomas Todd resumed his post as secretary. The convention quickly turned
its attention to the recently passed (third) Enabling Act and met as committee of the whole to
examine the document. Isaac Shelby, who chaired the committee, addressed the convention on
Thursday, July 23. Shelby explained that the terms outlined in the document were substantially
different than those put forth in the Second Enabling Act and approved by the fifth statehood
convention. The second and sixth articles of the document were quite different than those agreed
upon in the second act: Kentuckians were to assume a sizeable portion of Virginia’s public debt
and non-appropriated lands were to remain under the auspices of the Virginia government after
statehood was achieved. The act also mandated that a date of separation could be set after
November 1, 1790, if delegates to the eighth convention agreed upon the terms set forth and
Congress consented to admit Kentucky to the union before September 1, 1790. The document no
longer contained a joint committee to settle disputes between the two states. Delegates voted
twenty-five to thirteen against the Third Enabling Act and resolved that the terms of the second
act promptly be restored. A committee was appointed to draft a resolution to the Virginia
lawmakers, and it was decided that the convention would reconvene following the modification
of the act. Before the meeting adjourned, delegates were directed to record the population count
of their respective counties and create precinct boundaries. The convention also passed
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resolutions condemning inadequate frontier defenses and promoting domestic manufactures,
likely an indicator of the continued interest in opening the Mississippi River.142
The Virginia General Assembly passed a fourth (and final) Enabling Act on December
18, 1789. The document remedied the criticisms leveled against the third act: Kentuckians were
only required to cover a portion of the national debt (rather than the Virginia public debt as
well); certificates issued after January 1, 1785, to finance expeditions against Amerindians were
to be redeemed by Kentuckians themselves; and Virginia could issue warrants for Kentucky land
through September 1, 1791, but could not reallocate unclaimed lands after May 1, 1792. The
fourth act restored the six-member joint committee to settle disputes between the two states and
called for the election of delegates in May 1790 to attend a ninth statehood convention,
scheduled to begin in July 1790. An official date of independence (after November 1, 1791)
could be selected by the convention so long as Congress consented to the move before that date.
The ninth statehood convention was empowered to call a constitutional convention that could
meet between November 1, 1791, and the actual date of independence. Delegates to the ninth
convention, which assembled in Danville on July 26, 1790, wasted little time before agreeing to
the outlined terms and conditions.143
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Benjamin Logan and Isaac Shelby were the only members of the court party in
attendance, and the assembly was again dominated by the country party. Though the partisans
objected to the document (and to separation in general), the convention voted twenty-four to
eighteen that Kentucky should join the union on June 1, 1792. The vote largely split along party
lines, with members of the country party voting in the affirmative, effectively ending the partisan
effort to derail the statehood movement. Plans for a state constitution advanced and by early
1791 the debates regularly appeared in the Kentucky Gazette. Congress assented to the move on
February 4, 1791. Fourteen days later it approved the Vermont statehood application, adeptly
maintaining the delicate balance of power between the northern and southern states. Two main
points of contention arose at the tenth and final statehood convention, which convened in
Danville on April 2, 1792, to frame a government for the soon-to-be state. On the second day of
the meeting, George Nicholas presented a series of resolutions that he intended to act as a
framework for the new state government. Delegates were divided about which courts should hold
jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. Nicholas believed the Kentucky Court of Appeals could
most efficiently settle such cases and, therefore, should exercise original and final jurisdiction in
those instances. The partisans saw this as yet another ploy to strip them of their land and objected
to the plan.144

Watlington, The Partisan Spirit, 196–98; Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 60–
61.
144
Marshall, History of Kentucky, 1:355–56, 360–62, 389, 393–96; Watlington, The
Partisan Spirit, 197–98, 218–22; Harrison, Kentucky’s Road to Statehood, 86–90, 104–14;
Littell, Political Transactions, 34–37, 116; Tachau, Federal Courts, 40–41. Littell mistakenly
stated that the elections for the upcoming constitutional convention were to begin on the first
Monday in December 1792 (corrected to 1791). The elections were actually slated for the
December 1791 court days—with the convention itself beginning on the first Monday in April
1792. See Ninth Convention Journal, KHS Collections; Harrison and Klotter, A New History of
Kentucky, 61–64; Constitutional Convention Journal, KHS Collections. The first constitutional
convention journal was later reprinted as the Journal of the First Constitutional Convention of
66

The right to hold slaves emerged as the most contentious issue discussed at the
convention. African Americans had long had a presence on the frontier and played a significant
role in the opening of the West. Slaves participated in western expeditions and faced the same
challenges and dangers as their white counterparts. A 1777 census taken at Fort Harrod revealed
that nineteen of the fort’s 198 inhabitants were slaves (seven under the age of ten). By 1790,
approximately 11,830 African Americans (16.2% of Kentucky’s total population) peopled the
area. Of the region’s 73,077 inhabitants, only 114 African Americans (0.2% of Kentucky’s total
population) were listed as free blacks. Few Kentuckians owned slaves and even fewer of those
individuals were considered planters (individuals who typically owned twenty or more slaves).
Slaves were, on average, valued at nearly two or three times the annual income of most
Kentucky smallholders.145 Some Kentuckians objected to the practice on a fundamental level, but
many simply could not afford to become slaveholders. The majority of Kentucky’s slave
population was concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest planters. These individuals, likely
members of the country party, hoped to re-create a planter culture in the West that mirrored that
of eastern Virginia. Kentucky planters often imported lavish goods, bred expensive horses, and
built fine homes. Lexington quickly emerged as a bustling commercial hub as the gentry
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strengthened their hold on the Kentucky economy. Opponents of slavery, however, threatened to
halt the gentrification of the developing economic system.146
Presbyterian minister David Rice, elected as a delegate to the tenth convention, led the
antislavery faction.147 Rice spoke in favor of emancipation and called for the cessation of slave
imports into Kentucky. “A slave is a member of civil society, bound to obey the laws of land; to
which laws he never consented; which partially and feebly protect his person; which allow him
no property; from which he can receive no advantage; and which chiefly, as they relate to him,
were made to punish him,” Rice lamented.148 “He is therefore bound to submit to a government,
to which he owes no allegiance; from which he receives great injury; and to which he is under no
obligations; and to perform services to a society, to which he owes nothing, and in whose
prosperity he has no interest.”149 Partisan leaders largely favored gradual emancipation—not
immediate abolition—and believed that steps must be taken to phase out the institution while
providing compensation to slaveholders. George Nicholas emerged as the chief proponent of
slavery in Kentucky and argued that the Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the
private property rights of slave owners. Nicholas also believed that the new state government
could not support widespread, compensated emancipation and feared the degradation of the
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white populace through miscegenation. Despite the efforts of Rice and others, a plantation and
slave-based economy defined much of the state by the late 1790s. The number of slaves living in
Kentucky increased by 241 percent—a growth rate much higher than that of the general
population—while the portion of slaveholders in the population modestly rose from 23.2 to 25.2
percent during that time.150
Kentucky officially became a state on June 1, 1792. Slaveholders across the United States
gained an important victory with the ratification and adoption of the 1792 constitution—
precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West. Kentucky lawmakers reaffirmed that notion
in 1799 when delegates to a second constitutional convention voted to strengthen the laws
protecting the institution.151 Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi
River and the port of New Orleans via the Treaty of San Lorenzo (commonly referred to as
Pinckney’s Treaty) on October 27, 1795. The integration of political and economic systems
bolstered the gentry’s foothold in the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky
frontier. Lexington quickly became the economic and political powerhouse of the state, despite
the city’s lack of a navigable waterway. The cultivation of hemp soon defined the Kentucky
economy, and, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, over forty thousand pounds of raw
fiber were exported to the lower South. Merchants, planters, and lawyers near Lexington
understood the need to link private enterprise with public finance, and Henry Clay soon emerged
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as the spokesman and champion of the developing Kentucky political economy—setting the
stage for his American System.152
Reflection
The Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s
history, and, when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the
development of the United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been
recognized. The intersection of the Kentucky statehood movement and the politics of the early
republic underscore a number of political, economic, and social issues that defined the domestic
and foreign policies of the United States as the untested national government struggled to assert
its political and economic independence in the years following the Revolutionary War.
Kentucky’s political leaders shaped the nation’s policies towards Native Americans, commerce
and transportation, and territorial expansion while carefully attending to their own local political
agendas. Kentuckians also played a critical role in reshaping the national government in debates
concerning the ratification of the Constitution. The debates at the statehood conventions were
likewise shaped by national and international issues, particularly Spain’s closure of the
Mississippi River, further demonstrating the importance of viewing Kentucky, and the separatist
movement, in a wider, transatlantic context.
Statehood ensured that Kentuckians would play a much larger role in remedying their
own economic, territorial, and security concerns—issues that the Virginia legislature and
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national government had either failed to address or improve since the late 1770s. These issues
mirrored those faced by American officials in the larger trans-Appalachian West as the United
States struggled to secure sustained commercial and territorial development well into the
nineteenth century. Although American officials hoped to bring stability to the region through
diplomacy, they were often at odds with one another and the region’s leaders about how best to
accomplish that goal. Kentucky lay at the center of a complex competition between the British,
Spanish, and regional Indian groups to halt US expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains.
These groups hoped to stunt the growth of the United States and protect their regional interests
by quashing its efforts to achieve sustained commercial and territorial development. The national
government failed to implement basic measures that ensured the physical and economic wellbeing of its outlying populace, and many, as a practical alternative, began to call for the creation
of an independent western state. These individuals believed that their needs could best be
addressed through localized government. Kentuckians assembled in convention ten times
between 1784 and 1792 to discuss the possibility of separating from Virginia.153
Kentuckians spoke out against the misappropriation of surveying fees, called for the
establishment of a western printer, supported protection for orphans and the poor, and identified,
in addition to a number of other issues, problems with the court system. They disapproved of the
lack of navigable roads, bridges, and waterways in the region despite the sizeable share of taxes
that Kentuckians paid to the Virginia state government. Most importantly, however, Kentuckians
sought protection from antagonistic Native groups and spoke out against their inability to mount
offensive strikes against them. Some Kentuckians began to question the legitimacy of the
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American Revolution in the West and adapted the images, symbols, and rhetoric of the war to
advocate separating from Virginia. The early statehood conventions centered on issues of land
redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as delegates
disparaged what they considered to be a distant and unresponsive state legislature. It was not
until Spain closed the Mississippi River to US traffic in 1784 that the movement gained traction
and began to be viewed as a North/South conflict, as legislators from Virginia sided with
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river.154
The Mississippi River played a vital role in the developing Kentucky commercial
economy. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their goods to market and expected the
national government to quickly negotiate the reopening of the waterway. The proposed
Jay/Gardoqui agreement merely heightened tensions in the region when word spread that the
settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five
to thirty years. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive
government, and some, such as Thomas Green of Louisville, threatened to take matters into their
own hands. Even the ongoing debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were
shaped by the arguments made by people in the West. Kentuckians questioned the rationale for
the new government and believed the new system would make it easier for the Atlantic states to
cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain. James Madison assured westerners that navigation
rights to the river would become a national issue under the new government. He expected
Kentucky delegates to play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to
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gain their support. Kentuckians did not actively participate in the debates, despite Madison’s
prediction, and the convention approved the new government in June 1788. Kentucky officially
became a state on June 1, 1792. Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi
River with the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty on October 27, 1795, and, by the late 1790s, a
plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state.155
The Spanish Conspiracy once again attracted the attention of Kentuckians, or at least the
writers of Kentucky history, in 1889 with the release of John Mason Brown’s The Political
Beginnings of Kentucky—eighty-three years after the publication of Littell’s Political
Transactions. Brown sought to clear his grandfather, the late Kentucky senator John Brown, and
his court party counterparts (not including James Wilkinson) of conspiracy charges. He instead
made a counter claim that country party leader Thomas Marshall had actually entered into
negotiations with Great Britain. This was followed with the publication of Thomas Marshall
Green’s The Spanish Conspiracy: A Review of Early Spanish Movements in the South-West in
1891. Green, the grandson of Humphrey Marshall, argued against Brown’s findings and
maintained that John Brown, along with Harry Innes, Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and
James Wilkinson himself, were key players in the Spanish Conspiracy. Temple Bodley, a
grandson of Harry Innes, closed the dialogue in 1926 with the release of his Reprints of Littell’s
Political Transactions in and Concerning Kentucky and Letter of George Nicholas to his friend
in Virginia also General Wilkinson’s Memorial. Bodley explained in an introduction to the
material that even James Wilkinson was not involved in the conspiracy and maintained that he
was more interested in undermining George Rogers Clark as commissioner of Indian affairs. The
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work did little to sway readers on either side of the controversy but offered the first printed
English translation of James Wilkinson’s memorial and expatriation declaration. Thus it would
seem that Francois Furstenberg’s “Long War for the West” did not end in 1815 with the signing
of the Treaty of Ghent, but, rather, continued into the twentieth century as the descendants of
Brown, Marshall, and Innes struggled to reclaim the memory of the Spanish Conspiracy and
Kentucky statehood movement.156

156

See Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky; Green, The Spanish Conspiracy;
Reprints of Littell’s Political Transactions; Furstenberg, “The Significance of the TransAppalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.”
74

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abernethy, Thomas P., ed. “Journal of the First Kentucky Convention, Dec. 27, 1784–Jan. 5,
1785.” Journal of Southern History 1 (Feb. 1935): 67–78.
______. Three Virginia Frontiers. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1940.
“An Ordinance for ascertaining the Mode of disposing of Lands in the Western Territory.”
Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, 1774–
1789. Library of Congress, Washington, DC. https://www.loc.gov/item/90898223/
(accessed April 10, 2017).
“An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North–West of the
River Ohio.” Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional
Convention, 1774–1789. Library of Congress, Washington, DC. https://www.loc.gov
/item/90898154/ (accessed April 10, 2017).
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ war and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754–1766. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.
Aron, Stephen. How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to
Henry Clay. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
______. “Sebastian, Benjamin.” In American National Biography Online. Available at
http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00281.html (accessed April 9, 2017).
Barksdale, Kevin T. The Lost State of Franklin: America’s First Secession. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2009.
______. “Introduction: Kentucky and the Struggle for the Early American West.” Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 114 (2016): 291–302.
Brown, John Mason. The Political Beginnings of Kentucky: A Narrative of Public Events
Bearing on the History of that State up to the Time of Its Admission into the American
Union. Louisville: John P. Morton, 1889.
“By the United States in Congress assembled. August 7, 1786: An Ordinance for the Regulation
of Indian Affairs.” Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional
Convention, 1774–1789. Library of Congress, Washington, DC. https://www.loc.gov/
item/90898173/ (accessed April 10, 2017).
The Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts. Edited by Raleigh Edward
Colston, Henry W. Flournoy, Sherwin McRae, and William Pitt Palmer. 9 vols. 1875–
1893. Reprint, New York: Kraus, 1968.

75

Calloway, Colin G. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native
American Communities. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Calloway, Colin G. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Cayton, Andrew R. L. “‘Separate Interests’ and the Nation-State: The Washington
Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West.” Journal
of American History 79 (1992): 39–67.
______. “Nicholas, George.” In American National Biography Online. Available at
http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00246.html (accessed April 9, 2017).
Chinn, George Morgan. Kentucky Settlement and Statehood, 1750–1800. Frankfort: Kentucky
Historical Society, 1975.
Clark, Thomas D. A History of Kentucky. Lexington, KY: John Bradford Press, 1960.
Collins, Lewis and Richard H. Collins. Collins’ Historical Sketches of Kentucky. 2 vols.
Covington, KY: Collins, 1874.
Constitutional Convention Journal. Kentucky Historical Society Collections. Kentucky Historical
Society, Frankfort, KY.
Coward, Joan Wells. Kentucky in the New Republic: The Process of Constitution Making.
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979.
Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia Convened at Richmond, on
Monday the Second Day of June, 1788, for the Purpose of Deliberating on the
Constitution Recommended by the Grand Federal Convention. 2nd ed. (Richmond,
1805).
Dowd, Gregory Evans. War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
Eighth Convention Journal. Kentucky Historical Society Collections. Kentucky Historical
Society, Frankfort, KY.
Filson, John. The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke. Wilmington: James
Adams, 1784. Available online from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, at
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=etas (accessed
February 25, 2017).
Fleming-Christian Correspondence, 1760–1795. Section 132. Hugh Blair Grigsby Papers.
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, VA.
76

Friend, Craig Thompson, ed. The Buzzel About Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Friend, Craig Thompson. Kentucke’s Frontiers. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
Furstenberg, Francois. “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic
History.” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 647–77.
Green, Thomas Marshall. The Spanish Conspiracy: A Review of Early Spanish Movements in the
South-West. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1891.
Griffin, Patrick. American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier. New York:
Hill and Wang, 2007.
Hagy, James William. “Without A Proper Theatre: The Many Careers of Ebenezer Brooks.”
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 80 (Summer 1982): 267–80.
Harrison, Lowell H. The Antislavery Movement in Kentucky. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1978.
______. John Breckinridge: Jeffersonian Republican. Louisville: Filson Club, 1969.
______. Kentucky’s Road to Statehood. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
______. “Shelby, Isaac.” In The Kentucky Encyclopedia, edited by John E. Kleber,
Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter, 815–16. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
Harrison, Lowell H. and James C. Klotter. A New History of Kentucky. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1997.
“Harry Innes versus Humphrey Marshall: depositions, 1809–1815.” Reuben T. Durrett
Collection on Kentucky and the Ohio River Valley. Durrett Cdx 206. Special Collections
Research Center. University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL.
Hening, William Waller, ed. The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, vol. 12. Richmond, VA: George
Cochran, 1823.
Hening, William Waller, ed. The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, vol. 13. Philadelphia: William Brown,
1823.
Herring, George. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York:
77

Oxford University Press, 2008.
Hinderaker, Eric. Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
“Horse Stealing [March 23, 1827].” In The Voice of the Frontier: John Bradford’s Notes on
Kentucky, edited by Thomas D. Clark, 109–112. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1993.
Horsman, Reginald. The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776–1815. Arlington Heights, IL:
Harlan Davidson, 1985.
Journal of the Convention, Begun and held at the Capitol in the town of Frankfort on Monday
the twenty-second day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand, seven hundred and
ninety-nine. N.p., n.d. Kentucky Historical Society Collections, Frankfort, KY.
Journal of the First Constitutional Convention of Kentucky. Lexington: State Bar
Association of Kentucky, 1942. Available online at http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ky_cons_conventions (accessed February 26,
2017).
Kentucke/Kentucky Gazette (Lexington, KY), 1787–1789.
Kleber, John E., Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter, eds. The Kentucky
Encyclopedia. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
Kukla, Jon. A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
Leadingham, Christopher L. “To Open ‘the Doors of Commerce’: The Mississippi River
Question and the Shifting Politics of the Kentucky Statehood Movement.” Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 114 (2016): 341–69.
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. Edited by Edmund C. Burnett. 8 vols.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921–1936.
Linklater, Andro. An Artist in Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James
Wilkinson. New York: Walker, 2009.
Littell, William. Political Transactions in and concerning Kentucky, from the First Settlement
Thereof, Until It Became an Independent State, in June, 1792. Frankfort, KY: William
Hunter, 1806.
Lucas, Marion B. A History of Blacks in Kentucky: From Slavery to Segregation, 1760–1891.
2nd ed. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003.
78

Lyman C. Draper Manuscript Collection (microfilm edition, 1949). State Historical Society of
Wisconsin.
Marshall, Humphrey. History of Kentucky. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Frankfort, KY: S. Robinson, 1824.
Montero de Pedro, José. The Spanish in New Orleans and Louisiana. Translated by Richard E.
Chandler. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 2000.
Narrett, David E. “Geopolitics and Intrigue: James Wilkinson, the Spanish Borderlands, and
Mexican Independence.” William and Mary Quarterly 69 (2012): 101–46.
Ninth Convention Journal. Kentucky Historical Society Collections. Kentucky Historical
Society, Frankfort, KY.
O’Rear, Edward C. “Justice Thomas Todd.” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 38
(April 1940): 112–19.
Paine, Thomas. “Public Good.” In The Works of Thomas Paine, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to
the Congress of the United States, in the Late War. Vol. 1. Philadelphia: James Carey,
1797.
The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series. Vol. 8: 10 March 1784–28 March 1786.
Edited by William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, Robert A. Rutland, and John C.
A. Stagg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Papers of James Madison. Series 1. General Correspondence, 1723–1859. Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
Paxton, William McClung. The Marshall Family, or a Genealogical Chart of the Descendants of
John Marshall and Elizabeth Markham, His Wife, Sketches of Individuals and Notices of
Families Connected with Them. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1885.
Ramage, James A. and Andrea S. Watkins. Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture
from the Early Republic to the Civil War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011.
Reprints of Littell’s Political Transactions in and Concerning Kentucky and Letter of George
Nicholas to his friend in Virginia also General Wilkinson’s Memorial (1926; repr., New
York: Arno Press / New York Times, 1971.
Rice, David. Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy, Proved by a Speech Delivered
in the Convention, Held at Danville, Kentucky. Philadelphia, 1792.
Rice, Otis K. Frontier Kentucky. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975.
Robertson, James R., ed. Petitions of the Early Inhabitants of Kentucky. Louisville: John P.
79

Morton, 1914.
Salafia, Matthew. Slavery’s Borderland: Freedom and Bondage Along the Ohio River.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Shaler, Nathaniel S. Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1885.
Available online at https://archive.org/details/ kentuckypioneerc00shal (accessed
February 26, 2017).
Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York:
W.W. Norton, 2008.
Slaughter, Thomas P. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Smith, Paul H. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, vol. 22: November 1, 1784–
November 6, 1785. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995.
Speed, Thomas. The Political Club, Danville, Kentucky, 1786–1790: Being an Account of an
Early Kentucky Society from the Original Papers Recently Found. Louisville: John P.
Morton, 1894.
Stearns, Susan Gaunt. “Borderland Diplomacy: Western Elites and the ‘Spanish Conspiracy.’”
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 114 (2016): 371–98.
Tachau, Mary K. Bonsteel. Federal Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky, 1789–1816.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
______. “Marshall, Humphrey.” In The Kentucky Encyclopedia, edited by John E. Kleber,
Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter, 609–10. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
Talbert, Charles Gano. “Kentuckians in the Virginia Convention of 1788.” Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 58 (1960): 187–193.
______. Benjamin Logan: Kentucky Frontiersman. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1962.
______. “Logan, Benjamin.” In The Kentucky Encyclopedia, edited by John E. Kleber,
Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter, 566–67. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
Teute, Fredrika J. “Land, Liberty and Labor in the Post-Revolutionary Era: Kentucky as the
Promised Land. PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988.
“The ‘Infamous Jay Treaty’ [February 9, 1827].” In The Voice of the Frontier: John Bradford’s
80

Notes on Kentucky, edited by Thomas D. Clark, 86–90. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1993.
Turner, Frederick Jackson. “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” In The
Frontier in American History, edited by Frederick Jackson Turner, 1–38. New York:
Henry Holt, 1921.
Usner, Daniel H., Jr. Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower
Mississippi before 1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
Van Atta, John R. Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the Old Republic,
1785–1850. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
Ward, Matthew C. Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years’ War in Virginia and
Pennsylvania, 1754–1765. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.
Watlington, Patricia. The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779–1792. New York: Atheneum,
1972.
Whitaker, Arthur Preston. “James Wilkinson’s First Descent to New Orleans in 1787.” Hispanic
American Historical Review 8 (1928): 82–97.
White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
Region, 1650–1815. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
William Fleming Papers. WLU Coll 0009. Special Collections. Leyburn Library. Washington
and Lee University, Lexington, VA.
Williams, John Alexander. Appalachia: A History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2002.
Winship, Marion Nelson. “Kentucky in the New Republic: A Study of Distance and
Connection.” In The Buzzel About Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land, edited by Craig
Thompson Friend, 101–23. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.
Zemler, Jeffery Allen. James Madison, the South, and the Trans-Appalachian West, 1783–1803.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.

81

APPENDIX A: OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY APPROVAL LETTER

82

APPENDIX B: BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KENTUCKY’S LEADING
POLITICAL FIGURES
John Bradford, of Fauquier County, Virginia, was born on June 16, 1749. Bradford moved to
Kentucky in 1779 and began working as a land surveyor the following year. He was persuaded in
1786 to establish a weekly paper and he, along with his brother, Fielding, traveled to
Philadelphia to obtain the necessary supplies and equipment. The first issue of the Kentucke
Gazette was printed on August 11, 1787. The paper published public announcements and
advertisements in addition to local, national, and international news. He renamed the paper with
the current spelling of the state in 1789. Bradford died on March 20, 1830. See Kleber, et al.,
eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Bradford, John,” for additional information.
Ebenezer Brooks was born in Philadelphia in 1750, and, after studying divinity, moved to
southwest Virginia by 1780. Brooks dabbled in a number of professions, including writing,
teaching, ministering, and practicing medicine. He was a leading member of the partisans, and
played important roles in the Kentucky statehood movement—first arguing for, and then against,
separation. Brooks died on April 25, 1799. See James William Hagy, “Without a Proper Theatre:
The Many Careers of Ebenezer Brooks,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 80
(Summer 1982): 267–80, for additional information.
John Brown was born in Staunton, Virginia, on September 12, 1757. Brown studied law, and,
after moving to Danville, Kentucky, in the summer of 1783, served in the Virginia General
Assembly as the Kentucky district’s representative from late 1783 to 1788. He represented the
district in the Confederation Congress from 1787 to 1788 and as a member of the US House of
Representatives (under the Constitution of 1787) from March 4, 1789, to June 1, 1792. Brown
represented the state of Kentucky in the US Senate from June 18, 1792, to March 3, 1805. He
died on August 28, 1837. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Brown,
John,” for additional information.
John Campbell, born in Ulster (northern Ireland) around 1735, had moved to Pennsylvania by
1761. Campbell supported Virginia’s claim to the Pittsburgh area, and, in return, was jointly
awarded four thousand acres of land near the falls of the Ohio River (present-day Louisville) in
1773. He moved to the area in late 1782 and quickly became a leading political figure in
Jefferson County. Campbell was a member of the partisans and was a delegate at the 1784 and
1785 statehood conventions. He was a delegate at the 1792 constitutional convention and later
served as a state senator from Jefferson and Fayette counties. Campbell died in 1799 at his senate
seat. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Campbell, John,” and Watlington,
Partisan Spirit, for additional information.
Joseph Crockett, of Botetourt County, Virginia, was born on May 7, 1742. Crockett held
various positions in the Continental Army before moving to Lexington, Kentucky, in May 1784.
He worked as a surveyor for Thomas Marshall and was a member of the Virginia General
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Assembly in 1786 and 1790. Crockett served as a member of the Kentucky House of
Representatives from 1792 to 1795 and in the Kentucky Senate from 1800 to 1804. He died
November 7, 1829, in Georgetown, Kentucky. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky
Encyclopedia, s.v. “Crockett, Joseph,” for additional information.
John Fowler, of Chesterfield County, Virginia, was born on April 27, 1756. Fowler attended
William and Mary College and served in the Continental Army before moving to Lexington,
Kentucky, in 1783. He represented Fayette County at the third statehood convention, was a
delegate at the Virginia ratification convention in June 1788, and later represented Kentucky in
the US House of Representatives from 1797 to 1807. Fowler died on August 22, 1840. See
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Fowler, John,” for additional information.
John Edwards, of Stafford County, Virginia, was born in 1748. Edwards moved to Kentucky in
1780 and obtained title to nearly twenty-three thousand acres of land. He was a member of the
Virginia General Assembly from 1781 to 1783 and again from 1785 to 1786. Edwards was a
delegate at some of the statehood conventions and was elected, with John Brown, in 1792 to
represent Kentucky in the US Senate. He held that position until March 3, 1795, and later served
in the state senate from 1796 to 1800. Edwards died in 1837. See Kleber, et al., eds., The
Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Edwards, John,” for additional information.
Harry Innes, of Caroline County, Virginia, was born on January 4, 1752. Innes was admitted to
the bar in 1773, and, after being appointed assistant judge to the supreme court of the Kentucky
district in 1782, moved to Kentucky in 1783. Innes was a leading member of the court party and
served as the Kentucky district’s attorney general from 1784 to 1789. He was appointed as
Kentucky’s first federal judge on September 24, 1789, and served in that capacity until his death
on September 20, 1816. See Tachau, Federal Courts, 31–53, for additional information.
Benjamin Logan, of Orange County, Virginia, was born in 1743 and moved to Kentucky in
March 1776. Logan became the first sheriff of Kentucky County, and, in addition to holding a
number of military appointments, served in both the Virginia and Kentucky General Assemblies.
He participated in the 1792 and 1799 Kentucky constitutional conventions, and later ran
unsuccessfully for governor of the state in 1796 and 1800. Logan died on December 11, 1802.
See Charles Gano Talbert, “Logan, Benjamin,” in Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky
Encyclopedia, 566–67, for additional information. See also Charles Gano Talbert, Benjamin
Logan: Kentucky Frontiersman (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962).
Humphrey Marshall, of Fauquier County, Virginia, was born in 1760 and moved to Lexington,
Kentucky, in the early 1780s. Marshall, a cousin of US chief justice John Marshall, worked as a
deputy surveyor and eventually became one of the wealthiest individuals in the area. He was a
member of the Danville Political Club, served in the Kentucky legislature in 1793 and 1794, and
represented the state of Kentucky as a US senator from March 4, 1795, to March 3, 1801.
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Marshall died on July 3, 1841. See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, “Marshall, Humphrey,” in Kleber,
et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, 609–10, for additional information.
Thomas Marshall, of Westmoreland County, Virginia, was born on April 2, 1730. He was
appointed surveyor general of Kentucky County around 1780, and, after the division of that
county, was appointed surveyor general of Fayette County in 1781. Marshall headed the country
party and is best known for being the father of US chief justice John Marshall. He died in Mason
County, Kentucky, on June 22, 1802. See Paxton, The Marshall Family, 19–23, for additional
information.
Samuel McDowell was born in Pennsylvania in 1735 and, at the age of two, moved with his
father to Virginia. McDowell relocated to Lexington, Kentucky, in 1783 and began working as a
surveyor before being appointed as a district court judge that same year. McDowell served as
convention president at all but the first and ninth statehood conventions. He died on September
25, 1817. See Speed, The Political Club, 56–59, for additional information.
George Muter, of Orange County (now Madison County), Virginia, moved to Kentucky in the
early 1780s. Muter was a member of the Danville Political Club and later served as the chief
justice of the Kentucky court of appeals. See Speed, The Political Club, 47–50, for additional
information.
George Nicholas was born in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1754 and studied law at the College of
William and Mary. He represented Hanover and Albemarle counties in the Virginia General
Assembly before moving to Kentucky in 1788. Nicholas quickly became one of Kentucky’s most
influential political figures and played an important role in shaping Kentucky’s first constitution.
Nicholas died on July 25, 1799. See Andrew Cayton, “Nicholas, George,” in American National
Biography Online, available at http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00246.html (accessed April 9,
2017).
David Rice, of Hancock County, Virginia, was born on December 29, 1733. Rice and his family
moved to Kentucky in 1783 after receiving a petition, signed by nearly three hundred
Presbyterian settlers, asking that he establish churches in their frontier communities. Rice owned
slaves and, though he led the antislavery movement in Kentucky, did not free them until his
death on June 18, 1816. See Salafia, Slavery’s Borderland, 46–48, and Ramage and Watkins,
Kentucky Rising, 257–58, for additional information.
Benjamin Sebastian was born in northern Virginia in 1745. He was educated as a minister and
lawyer before coming to Kentucky in 1784. Sebastian was appointed as a judge to the Kentucky
court of appeals in 1792. He resigned in 1806 following the formation of an investigative
committee to examine his dealings with Spain. Sebastian died in March 1834. See Stephen Aron,
“Sebastian, Benjamin,” in American National Biography Online, available at
http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00281.html (accessed April 9, 2017).

85

Isaac Shelby was born on December 11, 1750, near Hagerstown, Maryland. He moved to
Lincoln County, Kentucky, in late 1783 and soon became one of Kentucky’s leading political
figures. Shelby was elected as Kentucky’s first governor on May 17, 1792, and served in that
capacity until June 1, 1796. He was elected to a second term as governor sixteen years later and
that time led the state from August 24, 1812, to September 5, 1816. Shelby died on July 18,
1826. See Lowell H. Harrison, “Shelby, Isaac,” in Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky
Encyclopedia, 815–16, for additional information.
Thomas Todd, of King and Queen County, Virginia, was born on January 23, 1765. Todd
studied law with Harry Innes, and, by 1784, had moved to Danville, Kentucky. He served as
clerk at all of the statehood conventions except the first. Todd worked as a law clerk to Harry
Innes, and then to the Kentucky House of Representatives, before being appointed to the
Kentucky court of appeals in 1801. He eventually served as chief justice of the court and was
later appointed to the US Supreme Court on March 3, 1807. Todd died on February 7, 1826. See
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Todd, Thomas,” and Edward C. O’Rear,
“Justice Thomas Todd,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 38 (April 1940): 112–19, for
additional information.
Caleb Wallace, of Lunenburg County (now Charlotte County), Virginia, was born in 1742.
Wallace worked as a minister until moving to Kentucky in 1782. He began practicing law and
was appointed as a judge to the supreme court of the Kentucky district on July 2, 1783. Wallace
later served on the Kentucky court of appeals from 1792 to 1813. He died in Woodford County,
Kentucky, in 1814. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Wallace, Caleb,”
for additional information.
James Wilkinson, of Calvert County, Maryland, was born on March 24, 1757. He was educated
as a physician, and, after holding various positions within the Continental Army, moved to
Kentucky in December 1783. Wilkinson was a leading member of the court party and at least
purported to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish empire in what became known as the Spanish
Conspiracy. He later became the senior officer of the US Army. Wilkinson died on December
28, 1825. See Linklater, An Artist in Treason, for additional information.
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